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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and Supreme Court Case No. 38759 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and 
Anytime Bail Bonds, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 
Respondent. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
 
Appeal from the Distriet Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.
 
HONORABLE KATHRYN A. STICKLEN
 
SCOTT MCKAY JOHN C. KEENAN 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO BOISE, IDAHO 
000001
 
   
   
 
Date: 7/26/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 04: 19 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 2 Case: CV-OC-2010-17486 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Two Jinn Inc vs. Idaho Department Of Insurance 
Two Jinn Inc vs. Idaho Department Of Insurance 
Date Code User Judge 
9/3/2010 NCOC CCRANDJD New Case Filed - Other Claims Kathryn A. SticklEm 
PETN CCRANDJD Petition for Judicial Review Kathryn A. SticklEm 
MOTN CCRANDJD Motion to Stay Final Agency Order Kathryn A. SticklEm 
AFSM CCRANDJD Affidavit In Support Of Motion Kathryn A. SticklEm 
MEMO CCRAND.ID Memorandum in Support of Motion Kathryn A. Sticklen 
9/13/2010 NOHG CCCHILER Notice Of Hearing Kathryn A. SticklEm 
HRSC CCCHILER Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/04/201003:00 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
PM) to stay final agency action 
9/16/2010 MEMO MCBIEHKJ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Stay Kathryn A. SticklEm 
Final Agency Order 
9/20/2010 OGAP DCTYLENI Order Governing Judicial Review Kathryn A. Sticklen 
9/24/2010 NOTC CCGARDAIL Amended Notice of Lodging Agency Record and Kathryn A. SticklE~n 
Transcripts 
NOTC CCSWEECE Petitioner's Notice Of Non-Objection To Agency Kathryn A. Sticklm 
Record 
9/29/2010 MISC CCHOLMEI= Certificate of Agency Record Kathryn A. SticklE!n 
9/30/2010 MEMO CCHOLMEI:: Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitioners Kathryn A. SticklE!n 
Motion to Stay 
10/4/2010 HRHD DCOATMAD Hearing result for Motion held on 10/04/2010 Kathryn A. SticklE!n 
03:00 PM: Hearing Held to stay final agency 
action 
ORDR DCOATMAD Order Granting Petitioner's Motion to Stay Final Kathryn A. Stickle!n 
Agency Order 
11/1/2010 STIP CCNELSRF Stipulation to Extend Time to File Petitioner's Kathryn A. Stickle!n 
Brief 
11/4/2010 ORDR DCTYLENI Order Approving Stipulation to Extend Time to Kathryn A. Stick/e'n 
File Petitioner's Brief (Opening Brief due 12/2/10) 
12/2/2010 BREF CCDWONCP Petitioner's Opening Brief Kathryn A. Stickle,n 
12/30/2010 BREF CCBOYIDR Respondent's Brief Kathryn A. Stickle,n 
1/20/2011 BREF CCWRIGRM Petitioners Reply Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
1/27/2011 NOTC CCHOLMEE Notice of Oral Argument Kathryn A. Sticklen 
2/15/2011 HRSC DCDANSEl. Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
02/16/2011 03:00 PM) 
2/16/2011 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held Kathryn A. Stickle n 
on 02/16/2011 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: NONE 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
5/3/2011 DEOP DCTYLENI Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Petition Kathryn A. Stickle n 
Seeking Judicial Review 
CDIS DCTYLENI	 Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho Department Of Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Insurance, Defendant; Two Jinn Inc, Plaintiff. 
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5/3/2011 STAT DCTYLENI STATUS CHANGED: Closed Kathryn A. SticklE!n 
6/7/2011 CCLUNDM.J Notice of Appeal Kathryn A. SticklE!n 
6/14/2011 MISC CCHEATJL Estimated Cost Of Appeal Transcript Kathryn A. SticklE!n 
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Attorneys for Petitioner Two linn, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
In the Matter of: 
TWO JINN, INC.'s 
Request for Declaratory Ruling 















TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and 






















1. Petitioner, Two Jinn Inc., which does business in Idaho as Aladdin and Anytime B :iiI 
Bonds (hereinafter "Two Jinn" or "Aladdin"), hereby petitions the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofIdaho, Ada County, for judicial review of a final agency action ofthe Idaho Department 































of Insurance (hereinafter "DOl"). This petition is filed pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 67-5232 
and 5270 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84 and seeks review of the DOl Director's Findings, 
Conclusions and Final Order (Final Order), which the Director filed on August 20, 2010 in tr e 
matter styled: In the Matter o/Two Jinn, Inc. 's Request/or Declaratory Ruling Regarding Id1ho 
Code § 41-1042, DOl Docket No. 18-2579-09. This Order determined Two Jinn's Request f,)[ 
Declaratory Ruling Regarding I.C. § 41-1042, which Two Jinn filed with the Director pursualt to 
I.e. § 67-5232(1) on December 10,2009. 
2. The Final Order was entered following oral argument before the Director on July 21, 
2010. Oral argument was previously presented to hearing officer Jean Uranga on March 8, 2010. 
Both arguments were taken before Monica M. Archuleta, Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public, M&M Court Reporting, Inc., P.O. Box 2636, Boise, 10 83701. Transcripts o:~ 
both of these proceedings have already been prepared and paid for by Two Jinn. 
3. Two Jinn provisionally states the issue for judicial review as follows: 
Whether the DOl erred and acted in violation of statutory provisions and in excess ofts 
authority by declaring that I.C. § 41-1042, which limits the charges a bail agent may assess in 
connection with a bail transaction, precludes Aladdin from entering into an indemnity agreement 
at the time of a bail transaction which permits the collection of apprehension and recovery co:;ts 
later incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear as required in court. 
4. Two Jinn requests that the previously prepared transcripts of oral argument before Ihe 
DOl Director and hearing officer described in paragraph 2, above, be made part of the record 
before the district court. 





5. I hereby certif:y that: 
(A) Service of the instant petition has been made upon the 001; 
(B) It is unnecessary to prepare additional transcripts; and 
(C) That the clerk of the agency has been paid the estimated fee for
 
the preparation of the record.
 
1',;;,1 
DATED this L day of September, 2010. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~~--
Scott McKay z3 
Attorneys for Two Jinn, Inc. 







CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/,.,( 
I CERTIFY that on September ..£, 20 I0, I caused a true and correct copy of the fore~,oing 
document to be: 
mailed 
{" hand deliven::d 
faxed 
to 
Office of the Director 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0043 
Mr. John C. Keenan 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0043 
~~ 
Scott McKay 
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Attorneys for Petitioner Two Jinn, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
In the Matter of: ) 
TWO lINN, INC.'s ) CaseNo·IV OC 1017486 
Request for Declaratory Ruling ) 
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042 ) PETITIONER'S MOTION TO 




TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation )
 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and )
 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and )
 
















Petitioner Two linn, Inc., moves this Court to stay enforcement of the Findings, 
Conclusions and Final Order on Request for Declaratory Ruling, which the Director for the Idaho 
Department ofInsurance filed on August 20, 2010 in the matter styled In the Matter o/Two Jinn, 





















Inc. 's Request/or Declarat01Y Ruling Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042, DOl Docket No.1 8­
2579-09. This Motion is brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(m) and I.C. § 67-5274 and is supported 
by the contemporaneously filed affidavit of James Garske and memorandum of counsel. 
"d
DATED this ~ day of September, 2010. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Scott McKay
 
Attorneys for Two Jinn, Inc.
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I CERTIFY that on September ~, 20 10, I caused a true and correct copy of the 





Office of the Director 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0043 
Mr. John C. Keenan 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0043 
-sc~-t ==;M-cKa-y~~--------=-----










Scott McKay (ISB# 4309)
 
Robyn Fyffe (ISB# 7063)
 




P.O. Box 2772 J. DAVIt} NAVA~RO, Clerk 






Attorneys for Petitioner Two Jinn, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
In the Matter of: 
TWO lINN, IJ\Jc.'s 
Request for Dec1aratot;y Ruling 









AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES GARSKE 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONI:R'S 








TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and 














1· AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES GARSKE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO 



























STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
lames Garske, being first duly swom, deposes and says that: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years old and I make the following statements based on m:' 
own personal knowledge. 
2. Since 2003, I have been employed by Two linn, Inc., which does business in Idaho as 
Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds (hereinaftcr "Two linn" or "Aladdin"). My present 
title is Director of N011hwest Operations and I currently supervise operations throughout Idaho. 
3. As Director of Northwest Operations, I am familiar with issues effecting the 
company's operations in thc Statc of Idaho. 
4. In 2004, represcntativcs of Aladdin and the Idaho Department of Insurance ("DOl") 
discussed thc position of a 001 representative that Idaho Code Section 41-1042 precludcs th(~ 
provision of an indcmnity agreement utilized by Aladdin which permits reimbursement for 
expenses incuned in attempting to re-capture a defendant who has failed to appear in Court 
("apprehension costs"). Aladdin's counse I at the ti me noti fied the DO I via lettcr dated 
November 9.2004 of our position that Scction 41-1042 docs not limit the remedies availablc 
upon breach of the bail bond agreement and that Aladdin was entitled to continue collecting 
reasonable apprehension costs. To my knowledge. no response to this Icttcr was received from 
the 001. 
5. I am unaware of further substantive communication from the 001 on this matter LITlti I 
on or about January 2009, when a 001 representative sent a letter to Aladdin's surety, Danielson 
National Insurance Company, indicating that a paragraph of Aladdin's indemnity agreement 
I·	 AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES GARSKE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO 















"appears to contain language that is not in compliance with Idaho Code 41-1042 ... specifically 
the language conceming recovery charges." This letter requested amendment of the indemni y 
agreement and prompted renewed good faith discussions between Aladdin and the 001 regarding 
Section 41-1042's applicability to apprehension costs. Following Aladdin and the DOl's 
continued disagreement, the parties discussed that Aladdin would seek a formal declaratory 
ruling from the 001 on Section 41-1042's scope pursuant to I.e. ~ 67-5232(1) from which 
Aladdin could thereafter seek judicial review if necessary. 
6. Aladdin requested a declaratory ruling from the 001 on or about December 10, 2009 
and is nm\/ seeking judicial review of the DOl's ruling. 
This ends my Affidavit. 
ri.?
JDATED this ------==-day of September, 20 J O. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO be ore me this ..JQ}0.55rJ day of SePli4id~f'I,
, ..' t> R T' ", ##.... c.. J:. ~;')"', ## 
c.'\ ; ••• ......,,'.5'. #4O#4O 
r.Y ...• ". l' # 
, (1 -~~ . ~hb1 . S' o't AR y \ .. \ 
Notary Public for Idahi·. _.- (" j S 
My commission expire\: • - \: ·0 i 
,. ~I 
~... 4'» ~ ~ 
~•••" -i 1'£ Of \~ •••••." ...............'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1"<:/ 
I CERTIFY that on September ~, 2010, I caused a true and coneet copy of the 
foregoing document to be: 
mailed 
L hand delivered 
faxed 
to: 
Office of the Director 
Idaho DepaJ1ment of Insurance 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise. ID 83720-0043 
Mr. John C. Keenan 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 8:n~0 
Boise. ID 83720-0043 
~. AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES GARSKE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO 












P.O. Box 2772 





Attorneys for Petitioner Two Jinn, Inc. 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
In the Matter of: ) 
TWO JINN, INC.'s ) 
Request for Declaratory Ruling ) 




TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation ) 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and ) 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and ) 
Anytime Bail Bonds; ) 
caseNo.CV OC 1017486 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO 





























I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2004, representatives of Two linn, Inc., which does business in Idaho as Aladdin and 
Anytime Bail Bonds (hereinafter "Two linn" or "Aladdin") and the Idaho Department of 
Insurance ("DOl") discussed the position of a DOl representative that Idaho Code Section 41­
1042 precludes Aladdin from entering indemnity agreements during the bail transaction that 
provide for reimbursement for expenses incurred in attempting to re-capture a defendant whc has 
failed to appear in Court ("apprehension costs"). Affidavit of James Garske, ~ 4. Aladdin 
notified the DOl via letter dated November 9, 2004 of its position that Section 41-1042 does not 
limit the remedies available upon breach of the bail bond agreement and that Aladdin was 
entitled to continue collecting reasonable apprehension costs. Id. The DOl did not substanti'lely 
respond to this letter. !d. 
In January 2009, a DOl representative sent a letter to the surety insurance company 
utilized by Aladdin, Danielson National Insurance Company, instructing it to amend the 
Indemnity Agreement to diminate the provision regarding collection of apprehensions costs. Id. 
at ~ 5. This letter prompted a renewed good faith discussion between Aladdin and the DOl 
regarding Section 41-1042' s applicability to apprehension costs. Id. Following the parties' 
continued disagreement, they discussed that Aladdin would seek a declaratory ruling on Section 
41-1042's scope from which Aladdin would thereafter seek judicial review if necessary. Id. 
On December 10, 2009, Aladdin petitioned the DOl for a declaratory ruling pursuant 10 
I.C. § 67-5232(1) asking the DOl to declare that I.C. § 41-1042 does not preclude bail agents or 
their surety from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bail transaction permitting 







the recovery of actual expenses later incurred in connection with the apprehension and surrerder 
of a criminal defendant as a result of that criminal defendant's failure to appear in court as 
required. 
The DOl assigned the matter to a hearing officer. The parties submitted briefs and 
stipulated to the relevant underlying facts and the hearing officer heard oral argument on March 
8,2010. On April 1,2010, the hearing officer issued "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Preliminary Order" finding that I.C. § 41-1042 precludes agreements providing for 
reimbursement for apprehension and surrender costs because those costs are not expressly 
delineated as permitted charges for the bail agent's service in a bail transaction. 
On April 14, 2010, Aladdin filed a Petition for Review of Preliminary Order with the 
Director of the DOl and the Director heard oral argument on July 21, 2010. On August 10, 2J10, 
the Director issued Findings, Conclusions and Final Order on Request for Declaratory Rulinf; 
("Final Order"), which ordered that bail agents and sureties are precluded by I.e. § 41-1042 from 
entering into indemnity agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs 
contemporaneously with the bail transaction. Aladdin has filed a Petition for Judicial Review 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(m) and I.e. § 67-5274 contemporaneously with the instant motion. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Upon appropriate terms, the reviewing court may stay the enforcement of the action of an 
agency that is subject to a petition for judicial review. I.C. § 67-5274; I.R.C.P. 84(m); see al~'o 
IDAPA 04.11.01.780 (final agency orders may be stayed by the judiciary according to statutel. 
There do not appear to be: any Idaho cases addressing the standard for granting a stay pursuant to 








I.c. § 67-5274 and I.R.C.P. 84(m). However, in ruling on a motion for a stay pending appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit considers: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is 
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a ,tay; 
(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the 
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. Calzjornia Pharmacists Ass'n v. 
Maxwell-Jol~v, 563 F.3d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 2009). The required degree of irreparable harm 
decreases as the probabil:ity of success increases. Golden Gate Restaurant Ass 'n v. City and 
County ofSan Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008). 
1.	 Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
Section 41-1042' s scope is an issue of first impression for Idaho courts and indeed, no 
Idaho case even cites this statute. The DOl's interpretation of this statute, as set forth in the Final 
Order, is contrary to the statute's plain language. Accordingly, Aladdin is likely to prevail or the 
nove11egal issue present(:d in the instant petition for review. 
At issue in this action is whether I.C. § 41-1042, which limits charges for the bail agel!' s 
service in the bail transaction, implicates the third paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement for 
Surety Bail Bond (hereinafter "Indemnity Agreement" or "Paragraph Three"). Paragraph Three 
obligates the indemnitor (the criminal defendant and/or a third party guarantor) to agree to pay 
expenses that might be incuned at a later date in the event the criminal defendant breaches the 
bail bond agreement by f:liling to appear in court as ordered and it becomes necessary to 
apprehend and return the defendant to court. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1 042( 1), a bail agent must not charge or collect money or other 












valuable consideration from any person except to pay premiums, to provide collateral, and to 
reimburse the bail agent for certain enumerated expenses incurred in connection with the bail 
transaction and, according to I.e. § 41-1042(2), a bail agent may not make any additional chcrges 
"for his service in a bail transaction." Paragraph Three does not describe charges for the bail 
agent's service in the bail transaction but, rather, describes the remedy available to Aladdin and 
its surety following the bail transaction in the event ofa breach of the agreement. Specifically, 
this remedy is only implicated in those situations where the principal breaches his obligatiom: by 
failing to appear as required in court. Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not apply to an agreement to 
pay the contingent recovery expenses set forth in Paragraph Three. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the statute's express provision pennitting bail agents to 
collect collateral to secure the bail bond, which necessarily contemplates that the parties may 
enter contracts describing remedies in the event of a breach of the bail bond agreement. The 
Final Order acknowledges that the collateral, which a bail agent is pennitted to collect under 
Section 41-1 042( 1)(b), is to secure the bail bond in the event of forfeiture. Thus, the Final O~der 
illogically interprets Section 41-1042 as pennitting bail agents to contract for payment of the 
entire bail bond but as prohibiting agents from contracting for reimbursement for apprehensi(,n 
expenses incurred in avoiding payment of the entire bail bond. 
This interpretation is internally inconsistent as neither the promise to pay the bail bond in 
the event of forfeiture nor the promise to pay investigative costs is enumerated in Section 41­
1042 as an allowable charge. Instead, Section 41-1042 has no application to either remedy 
because neither represents a charge for the bail agent's service during the bail transaction. 






Accordingly, the DOl's interpretation is contrary to the statute's plain language and Aladdin s 
likely to prevail on the merits of the instant petition for review. 
2.	 Respective Risk of Injury to the Parties 
The scope ofIdaho Code § 41-1042 and its effect on bail agents' ability to contract for 
the recovery of apprehension expenses at the time of the bail transaction has been the subject of 
good-faith discussions between Aladdin and DOl representatives for several years. The 
Indemnity Agreement at issue has been utilized by Aladdin during these discussions. Ifunable to 
continue using this agreement, Aladdin will be forced to either cease apprehension efforts wrere 
a defendant fails to appear in court and simply collect the forfeiture from the indemnitor or 
defendant, or to absorb those costs itself. In contrast to this irreparable financial injury, neither 
the DOl nor the public wJill suffer an injury from a stay on the terms suggested by Aladdin and by 
maintaining the status quo pending resolution of the instant petition for review. 
The DOl's apparent concern involves the risk that bail bond consumers will be subjected 
to unfair practices and, specifically, the risk that a consumer could be held liable for 
apprehension costs in addition to the face amount of the bond in the event the bond remains 
forfeited notwithstanding Aladdin's investigative efforts. Initially, Aladdin is unaware of any 
allegation that it has attempted to collect unreasonable apprehension fees. Indeed, Aladdin is 
already of the view that apprehension costs must not be excessive in relation to the face amOllnt 
of the bond. See, e.g. I.C. § 41-1043 (collateral may not be excessive in relation to the face 
amount of the bond). 
The DOl agrees that Aladdin can require an indemnitor to post collateral at the time of 







the bail transaction to secure the entire amount of the bail bond. An additional promise - sec ured 
or unsecured - to reimburse Aladdin for apprehension expenses incurred in returning an 
absconder to court does not expose the defendant or his indemnitor to any additional risk of 
injury, particularly where the total liability is limited by the face amount of the bond. Indeed, 
such agreements protect the consumer (and as discussed below serve the public interest) by 
providing Aladdin with an incentive to re-capture the defendant and obtain exoneration of thr~ 
bond, rather than simply letting the forfeiture stand and collecting the entire amount of the bCllld 
from the indemnitor or dl~fendant. Further, an indemnitor is better served by funding the cos:s of 
apprehension and return of the criminal defendant as opposed to paying the higher cost of a 
forfeited bond. 
The Final Order dliscusses two circumstances in which an indemnitor may prefer not 10 
agree to reimburse apprehension costs notwithstanding these concerns: (l) the indemnitor 
believes that he will have: a better chance of convincing the defendant to appear or surrender l)r 
(2) the indemnitor be1ievl~s that searching for the defendant would be futile so wants to limit lis 
liability to the face amount of the bond. Of course, the second concern is entirely addressed by 
Aladdin's agreement that the indemnitor's liability for both the forfeiture and apprehension O)sts 
is limited to the face amount of the bond. 
As to the first concern, as a matter of sound business practice, Aladdin always attemp's to 
utilize the least intrusive investigative tactics to secure the surrender of the defendant, including 
contacting the indemnitor and requesting his assistance in convincing the defendant to self-
surrender. Further, the unreasonable nature of any expenses would be a defense to collection 











efforts. For instance, in Saladino v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 39 A.D.2d 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), a 
bail agent sought to recover, pursuant to an indemnity agreement, a $4,000 fee paid to a licer sed 
investigator to apprehend and surrender the principal to custody. 39 A.D.2d at 765. The court 
held that under the broad language of the indemnity agreement, the bail agent was entitled to 
recover expenses incurred in recapturing and surrendering the principal, provided such exper.ses 
are the fair and reasonable value of services rendered. !d. However, because the principal was 
residing with his wife without any attempt at concealment and working at his regular 
employment, a $4,000 investigator fee was unreasonable. Id. In remanding for a new trial to 
determine the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered the court noted that there wa~ no 
apparent reason why a surety should not first mount a more modest, superficial investigation 
such as would have been adequate to locate the principal herein. 
Aladdin stands to suffer irreparable injury if the Final Order becomes effective pending 
the instant petition for review. Conversely, neither the DOl nor the public will be harmed by 
maintaining the status quo and entering a stay as requested by Aladdin. 
3.	 Public Interest 
Prohibiting Aladdin from recovering expenses incurred in recapturing and surrenderir g a 
defendant is contrary to public policy. The primary purpose of bail is to ensure the presence of 
the accused. State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 655, 167 P.3d 788,792 (Ct. 
App. 2007). Bail agents have the authority, and in fact are encouraged, to arrest a defendant who 
has missed a court appearance and return him to court. See I.C. § 19-2914 (at any time befon: the 
exoneration ofbail, the surety insurance company or its bail agent ... may empower any pefS)n 








of suitable age and discretion to arrest the defendant at any place within the state"); I.C. § 
19-2922 ("court shall order the bail exonerated: if the "defendant has appeared before the court 
within one hundred eighty (180) days of the court's order of forfeiture"); I.C.R. 46(h) (permitting 
court to set aside forfeiture if it appears that justice does not require its enforcement after 
consideration of several factors including "the participation of the person posting bail in loca ting 
and apprehending the defendant"). 
The purpose of bail is served by providing the surety a financial incentive to locate 
absconders and return them to the court. See County Bonding Agency v. State, 724 So.2d 13] , 
133 (Fla. App. 1998) ("The purpose of [a Florida statute permitting exoneration when the surety 
has substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant] is 
to create a financial incentive for sureties to locate and apprehend fugitives"); Board ofCom 'rs 
ofBrevard v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So.2d 10, 12 (Fla. App. 2003) (liberal interpretation 
of forfeiture statutes in favor of sureties provides incentives to sureties "to pursue those who lee 
the jurisdiction"). 
It is axiomatic that there are costs associated with locating and apprehending absconding 
criminal defendants. Further, it is not disputed that Aladdin can seek reimbursement for the 
amount of a bail bond forfeiture. However, if Aladdin could not recover investigation costs, ;Tet 
could recover the amount of the forfeited bond, it would have no financial incentive to locate and 
return a criminal defendant to court. Such a result would be contrary to the bail bond's purpo ~e 
of ensuring the defendant's appearance in court. 
Moreover, the criminal defendant and his indemnitor's obligation under Paragraph Three 












provide an important incentive to the defendant to appear for court. If the criminal defendan 
knows that neither he nor his indemnitors, often family or friends, will be financially responsible 
in the event he absconds, he is more likely to skip bail. Similarly, if the indemnitors are 
financially responsible if the defendant skips bails, they have a financial incentive to assist the 
defendant in making it to court or to assist the bail agents in effectuating the defendant's 
surrender should he fail to do SO.l 
Permitting Aladdin to continue entering indemnity agreements permitting the recover:r of 
apprehension expenses furthers many of the public policy considerations at issue. According; y, 
the public interest lies in granting Aladdin the requested stay. 
III. CONCLUSION 
It is appropriate to maintain the status quo by staying the effectiveness of the Final Order 
pending judicial review given the novelty of the issue presented, the parties' history of good-£lith 
discussions, the plain language of the statute and the financial harm that Two Jinn will suffer ifit 
is unable to recover apprehension costs that an absconding defendant and his indemnitor has 
previously agreed to pay. A stay will also serve the public interest by providing bail agents anl 
their surety with the financial incentive to locate and return absconding criminal defendants to 
court. Accordingly, the Court should order that the effectiveness ofthe Final Order be stayed 
pending judicial review and a conclusion of this action. 
lIn argument before the Director, notwithstanding his disagreement over the interpretation 
of the statute, counsel for DOl staff indicated that he agreed "wholeheartedly with" Aladdin's 
public policy arguments in this regard and that Aladdin's interpretation of the statute furthers the 
purpose of bail. Tr. (7-21-2010) p. 20, In. 10-15. 








DATED this £ day of September, 2010. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~~ 
Scott McKay ~~:2 
Attorneys for Two Jinn, Inc. 




    
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
rq 
I CERTIFY that on September~, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be: 
mailed 
;( hand deliven~d 
faxed 
to 
Office of the Director 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0043 
Mr. John C. Keenan 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0043 
~ 
ScottMcKay ~ 








SEP 16 2010 
LAWRENCta~wR'5~~~lerk 
Attorney General 
JOHN C. KEENAN 
Deputy Attorney GeneraJl 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
700 W. State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0043 
Telephone: (208) 334··4283 
Facsimile: (208) 334··4298 
Idaho State Bar No. 3873 
Attorneys for Department ofInsurance 
NO ' , 
~: 11:.'&/ FltE~r.1-__ 
SEPJ1'61 ZQ1 OJ 





IN THE DISTR1CT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
In the Matter of: 
TWO JINN, INC.'s 
Request for Declaratory Ruling 
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042 
TWO JINN INC., a California corporation 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and 
doing business Aladdin Bail Bonds and 
Anytime Bail Bonds, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
INSURANCE, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV OC 1017486 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO 
STAY FINAL AGENCY ORDER 
Respondent Idaho Department of Insurance (hereinafter "Department") opposes the 
Petitioner's Motion to Stay Final Agency Order. The Director of the Idaho Department of 
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Insurance entered his Findings, Conclusions, and Final Order on Request for Declaratory Ruling 
on August 20,2010. Petitioner has filed its Memorandum in Support ofPetitioner's Motion to 
Stay Final Agency Order (hereinafter "Petitioner's Memorandum") in support of its Petition. 
This is the Department's response to that memorandum. 
Whether to grant a motion to stay an action from an agency order is governed by Id;mo 
Code § 67-5274 and LR.C.P. Rule 84(m). Both references are similar in form. Section 67-5:~74 
states: "the filing of the petition for review does not itself stay the effectiveness or enforcement 
of the agency action. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon 
appropriate terms." Idaho Code § 67-5274. It appears that Idaho's Supreme Court has not 
reviewed the standards granting or denying a motion to stay an agency action on appeal. 
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that, "[w]hen deciding whether to issue a s1ay, 
... [the court will] considt:r (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that [it] is 
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absert a 
stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the 
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. California Pharmacists Assn. v. Maxw.?ll-
Jolly, 563 F.2d 847, 849-850 (2009) (citing Humane Soc'y of us. v. Gutierrez, 527 F.3d 788, 
789-90) (9th Cir. 2008)). See, also, Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2] 13 
(1987). 
In a 2008 decision, the 9th Circuit explained this standard. The Circuit noted in the C,lse 
of Golden Gate Restaurant Assn v. San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, that 
the standard for granting a stay is a continuum. At one end of the continuum, if 
there is a "probability" or "strong likelihood" of success on the merits, a relatively 
low standard of hardship is sufficient. {Citations omitted.] At the other end, if 
"the balance of hardships tips sharply in ... favor" of the party seeking the stay, a 
relatively low standard of likelihood of success on the merits is sufficient. 
{Citation omitted.] 









Golden Gate Restaurant Assn v. San Francisco, 512 F.3d at 1119. Additionally, "'where the 
public interest lies' must be considered separately from and in addition to whether the applicant 
for a stay will be irreparably injured absent a stay." Cytosport, Inc., v. Vital Pharmaceutic1ls, 
Inc., 617 F.Supp.2d, 1051, 1084 (E.D.Cal. 2009) (quoting Natural Resources De! Council v. 
Winter, 502 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2007). 
The Petitioner requested a declaratory ruling from the Department in a December 10, 
2009, letter addressed to the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance, asking the 
Department to, 
declare that I.C. § 41-1042 does not preclude a bail agent or surety from entering 
into an indemnity agreement at the time of the bail transaction which permits 
recovery from a criminal defendant or third party indemnitor of actual expenses 
later incurred in connection with the apprehension and surrender of a criminal 
defendant who fails to appear in court. 
Scott McKay, Esq., letter on behalfof Two Jinn, Inc., to the Director dated December 10, 2009, 
asking for Declaratory Ruling, (hereinafter "Letter to Director dated December 10, 2009"). 
Attached to that letter is "Exhibit A," entitled "Indemnity Agreement for Surety Bail Bond 
Danielson National Insunmce Company" (hereinafter "Indemnity Agreement"). Embedded in 
that Indemnity Agreement and identified as "Paragraph Three" is the indemnity clause at issm: in 
this proceeding, and it reads as follows: 
THIRD: to reimburse [Two Jinn, Inc.] and Surety for actual expenses incurred 
and caused by a breach by the Principal of any of the terms for which the 
application and Bail Bond were written, including all expenses or liabilities 
incurred as a result of searching for, recapturing or returning Principal to custody, 
incurred by [Two Jinn, Inc.] or Surety or as necessary in apprehending or 
endeavoring to apprehend Principal, including legal fees incurred by [Two Jinn, 
Inc.] or Surety in making application to a court for an order to vacate or to set 
aside the order of forfeiture or Judgment entered thereon. However, no expenses 
or liabilities incun'ed for recapturing or returning Principal to custody shall be 
chargeable after entry of Judgment. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY FINAL AGENCY ORDER - 3 
000029
  
See, Letter to Director dated December 10, 2009, Exhibit A. In the words of the Petitioner, the 
above quoted Indemnity Agreement, 
obligates the indemnitor (the criminal defendant and/or a third party guarantor) to 
agree to pay exp~~nses that might be incurred at a later date in the event the 
criminal defendant breaches the bail bond agreement by failing to appear in court 
as ordered and it becomes necessary to apprehend and return the defendant to 
court. 
Petitioner's Memorandum at p. 4. The Petitioner's Motion to Stay pending appeal should be 
denied. 
1.	 Has Petitioner made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the 
merits? 
Section 41-1042, Idaho Code, provides: 
Collections and charges permitted. (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this chapter [10, title 41, Idaho Code], a bail agent in any bail transaction shall 
not, directly or indirectly, charge or collect money or other valuable consideration 
from any person, except for the following: 
(a) To pay premiums at the rates established by the insurer; 
(b) To provide collateral; 
(c) To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incurred in connection 
with the bail transaction, limited to the following: 
(i) Expendiitures actually and reasonably incurred to verify underwriting 
information or to pay for notary public fees, recording fees, or necessary long 
distance telephone or telegram fees; provided however, that the total of all 
such expenditures reimbursed shall not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00); and 
(ii) Travel expenses incurred more than twenty-five (25) miles from a bail 
agent's place of business, which includes any city or locality in which the bail 
agent advertises or engages in bail business, up to the amount allowed by the 
internal revenue service for business travel for the year in which the travel 
occurs. 
(2) Except as permitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any charge 
for his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully document all 
expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement. 
Idaho Code § 41-1042(1). With respect to charges for service, section 41-1042 further states: 
Except as permitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any charge for 
his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully document all 
expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement. 






Idaho Code § 41-1042(2). The Petitioner notes in its Memorandum that its Indemllity 
Agreement, quoted hereinabove, "does not describe charges for the bail agent's service in the 
bail transaction but, rather, describes the remedy available to Aladdin and its surety following the 
bail transaction in the event of a breach of the agreement. ... [T]his agreement is only implicBted 
... where the principal breaches his obligations by failing to appear as required in court." 
Petitioner's Memorandum at p. 5. The Petitioner further asserts that "Idaho Code § 41-1042 
does not apply to an agreement to pay the contingent recovery expenses set forth in Ithe 
Indemnity Agreement]." Petitioner's Memorandum at p. 5. In other words, according to the 
Petitioner, section 41-1042 permits bail agents to collect collateral to secure the bail bond, 
"which necessarily contemplates that the parties may enter contracts describing remedies in the 
event ofa breach of the bail bond agreement." Petitioner's Memorandum at p. 5. 
The Department differs with the Petitioner's observations. First of all, the indemllity 
clause ("Paragraph Three"') referenced above is embedded into the Indemnity Agreement and is a 
part ofthe bail transaction. See, Letter to Director dated December 10, 2009. 
With regard to section 41-1042, task of statutory interpretation "begins with the litc:ral 
words of a statute, which are the best guide to determining legislative intent. The words cf a 
statute should be given th(~ir plain meaning, unless a contrary legislative purpose is expressec or 
the plain meaning creates an absurd result." KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum, -­
Idaho --, -- P.3d --, (Idaho 2010) (No. 36162) (WL 2927175) (Citation omitted). 
The plain words of section 41-1042 govern the bail transaction in question. The pertinent 
part of that section reads that "a bail agent in any bail transaction shall not, directly or indirectly, 
charge or collect money or other valuable consideration from any person except for the 
following: (a) To pay premiums at the rates established by the insurer; (b) To provide collate~al; 










(c) To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incurred in connection with the bail 
transaction, limited to thl~ following: [underwriting and related expenses and travel experses 
(See, above)]." Idaho Code § 41-1042(1) (emphasis here). 
As a part of the bail transaction, section 41-1042 governs the Petitioner's Indemnity 
Agreement. In a bail transaction, "'Bail' means a monetary amount required by the cour: to 
release the defendant from custody and to ensure his appearance in court as ordered." Idlho 
Code § 41-1038(1). The term "bail bond" is defined as "a financial guarantee, posted by a bail 
agent and underwritten by a surety insurance company, that the defendant will appear as 
ordered." Idaho Code § 41-1038(3). 
"A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between the state on one side and an 
accused and his or her surety on the other." State v. Two Jinn, Inc., -- Idaho --, -- P.3d --, (May 
19,2010 WL 1980405 (Idaho App.)) (subject to withdrawal) (quoting State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 
993, 995, 188 P.3d 935, 937 (Ct.App. 2008)). "The extent of the surety's undertakin~, is 
determined by the bond agreement and is generally subject to the rules of contract law and 
suretyship." Id. 
In a bail transaction involving the court where it sets bail to ensure the accused's 
appearance, the bail agent may not directly or indirectly charge or collect money or other 
valuable consideration eXI;ept to pay premiums, provide collateral, and reimburse for expenses 
covered in section 41-1042(1)(c). "Collateral" is defined as "property of any kind given as 
security to obtain a bail bond." Idaho Code § 41-1038(4). 
In its Memorandum, Petitioner notes correctly that section 41-1042 permits bail agent~; to 
collect "collateral to secure the bail bond." Petitioner's Memorandum at p. 5. It does [lot 
necessarily follow, however, that because section 41-1042 permits collateral to secure the bail 




bond that the statute necessarily contemplates expansion of that definition to include contractual 
remedies to secure payment of apprehension expenses as provided in "Paragraph Three." 
Section 41-1042 permits collateral to be provided to secure a bail bond. No 01her 
valuable consideration from any person may be charged or collected other than what is set forth 
in section 41-1042. The additional remedy the Petitioner is seeking to secure in the forn: of 
"Paragraph Three" is an attempt to collect other valuable consideration not permitted under the 
express words of section 41-1042. 
2. Will the applkant be irreparably injured absent a stay? 
There is no irreparable injury if the Petitioner is compliant with the law. As the sta1ute 
clearly states, the bail agent in a bail transaction may not directly or indirectly charge or coLect 
money or other consideration outside of what is permitted by law. The Indemnity Agreem ent 
cannot be included in the bail transaction. It is that simple. 
The Petitioner will not be forced to cease apprehension efforts. The Department has not 
taken that position. Simply stated, the Petitioner is barred from collecting "other consideration" 
within the bail transaction. The law does not prevent the Petitioner from entering into an 
agreement outside of the bail transaction to secure apprehension costs. 
3. Public Interest. 
The Constitution of the State of Idaho provides that all persons shall be "bailable by 
sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses," not in excessive amounts. Const. art. vi, § 6. 
The purpose of bail is to e:nsure the appearance of defendants before the court and to protect the 
right of defendants to bail. Idaho Code § 19-2902(2). It is also the public policy of the statt: of 
Idaho to regulate bail agents because bail agents "provide an important local retail service to the 
retail consumers of bail bonds; [there should be] a uniform and consistent regulatory framewl)rk 




that governs retail bail practices; and [t]here is a need to provide consumer protection fi'Om 
unscrupulous and unfair practices." Idaho Code § 41-1037(1) and (2). 
The foregoing constitutional and statutory citations state the public interest regarding the 
bail bond transactions. Compliance with these laws and section 41-1042 furthers the pUJlic 
interest as expressed by Idaho's Legislature. 
In conclusion, the Department believes the Petitioner will not likely prevail at hearing on 
the merits of this matter and that there is no irreparable harm demonstrated when the Petiticner 
complies with the Final Order on file herein. Therefore, the Motion to Stay the Final Older 
pending final judgment on appeal should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this Ia£day of Seft", ~~ 2010. 
OFFICE OF ATTOR1\TEY GENERAL 
~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have, on this 11~day of &deuckr 2010, 
I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following by the 
designated means: 
Scott McKay 1ZI first class mail 
Robyn Fyffe D certified mail 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP D hand delivery 
P.O. Box 2772 D via facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
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WILLIAM W. DEAL 
Director 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0043 
Telephone: (208) 334-4250 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4298 
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IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIUCT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
TWO lINN, INC, a Califomia corporation 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and 
Anytime Bail Bonds, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV OC 1017486 
NOTICE OF LODGING AGENCY 
RECORD AND TRANSCIUPTS 
COMES NOW the Director of the Department of Insurance, by and through his 
undersigned assistant, and notifies the Court and parties that the Department has lodged the 
Agency Record, including transcripts from the proceedings before the Department, in the Metter 
of Two linn, Inc.'s Request for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042, Docket 
No. 18-2579-09, and certifies that a copy of the record is available for pick up and review at the 
address set forth below. Petitioner shall pay the Department of Insurance the balance of the j(;~es 
for preparation of the record in the amount of Seven and 95/100ths Dollars ($7.95). 



















DATED this !5cX~day of September 2010. 
WILLIAM W. DEAL 
Director, Idaho Department of Insurance 
j ~ 
By: u--<-~ {:/~ 
TERESA JONES 
Assistant to the Director 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this tWay of September 2010 caused a true md 
correct copy of the foregoing notice to be served upon the following by the designated means: 
Scott McKay ~st class mail 
Robyn Fyffe D certified mail 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, Md(AY & BARTLETT, LLP D hand delivery 




John C. Keenan D first class mail 
Deputy Attorney General D certified mail 
Idaho Department of Insurance [!?hand delivery 






~~ TE~SA JONES /'< . 
Assistant to the Directoi· 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
In the Matter of: 
TWO JINN, INC.'S RHquest for 
Declaratory Ruling Re!garding Idaho 
Code § 41-1042, 
TWO ...IINN, INC., a California corporation 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and 
Doing business As Aladdin Bail Bonds 
and Anytime Bail Bonds, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
INSURANCE, 
Respondent. 






Petition for Judicial Review having been filed herein, and it appearing that th 3 
issues presented on appeal are questions of law and fact; and it further appearing that a 
record/transcript is necessary to process this appeal: 
It is ORDERED: 
1) That upon completion of the record the agency shall mail or deliver a notice of 
lodging of transcript and record to all attorneys of record or parties appearing in person 
and to the district court. 
ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 1 
000038
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2) That the notice shall inform the parties before the agency that they pick up a 
copy of the transcript and record at the agency and that the parties have fourteEin (14) 
days from the date of the mailing of the notice in which to file with the agency any 
objections, and the notice will further advise the petitioner to pay the balance of tt- e fees 
for preparation before the transcript and record will be delivered to the petitioner. 
3) That the A!Jency shall transmit the settled transcript and record to the district 
court within forty-two (42) days of the service of the petition for judicial review. 
4) That the Agency, upon filing with the Court the record, shall send nctice of 
such filing to all parties; 
5) That the Petitioner's brief shall be filed and served within thirty-five (35) clays of 
the date the transcript and record are filed with the Court. 
6) That the RI9spondent's brief shall be filed and served within twenty-eig 1t (28) 
days after service of Petitioner's brief. 
7) That Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within twerty-one 
(21) days after service of Respondent's brief. 
8) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument after all briHfs are 
filed, and that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither part~1 does 
so, the Court will deem oral argument waived and decide the case on the briefs and the 
record. 
Dated this 20th day of September, 2010. 
~f (j ffltih...-­
KATHR STICKLEN 
Senior District Judge 





CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of September, 2010, I mailed (served) a true 
and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
JOHN C. KEENAN 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0043 
SCOTT MCKAY 
NEVIN BENJAMIN MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
PO BOX 2772 
BOISE, ID 83701 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
BY: .J.-_~~----IT- _ 
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f\ECE\VED 
SEP 1. ~ 1.0'0 
County c\erkAda " DAVie NAVAl1FlO , C,erk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC, a Califomia corporation 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and 
Anytime Bail Bonds, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CVOCI017486 
AMENDED NOTICE OF LODGING 
AGENCY RECORD AND 
TRANSCRIPTS 
COMES NOW the Director of the Department of Insurance, by and through .1IS 
undersigned assistant, and provides the Court and parties with an anlended notice that lhe 
Department, on September 15, 2010, lodged the Agency Record, including transcripts from lhe 
proceedings before the Department, in the Matter of Two Jinn, Inc.'s Request for Declaratc,ry 
Ruling Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042, Docket No. 18-2579-09, and a Notice of Lodging was 
mailed to the parties on that date and filed with the Court on September 16, 2010. The recc,rd 
was received by counsel for Petitioner on September 20, 2010, at which time Petitioner paid the 

















balance of the fees for preparation of the record. The record was received by counsel for 
Respondent on September 16, 2010. 
Pursuant to Rule 84(j), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court's Order Governing 
Judicial Review, the parties are informed that they have fourteen (14) days from the date oflhe 
mailing of the initial notict~ in which to file with the agency any objections to the record. 
DATED this--.;8"/1jay of September 2010. 
WILLIAM W. DEAL 
Director, Idaho Department ofInsurance 
By: ~dA.t-,~ 
TERESA JONES / 
, I 
Assistant to the DirecttH'/ 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on thi~day of September 2010 caused a true arld 
correct copy of the foregoing notice to be served upon the following by the designated means: 
Scott McKay [01irst class mail 
Robyn Fyffe D certified mail 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP D hand delivery 




John C. Keenan D first class mail 
Deputy Attorney General D certified mail 
Idaho Department of Insurance [J11iand delivery
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: .. J 1/ J0 __ - -' tL~_.___- - ", _'. 
WILLIAM W. DEAL 
Director 
Idaho Department of Insurance 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0043 
Telephone: (208) 334-4250 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4298 
IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIUCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC, a Califomia corporation 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and Case No. CV OC 1017486 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and 
Anytime Bail Bonds, CERTIFICATE OF AGENCY RECORD 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF n~SURANCE, 
Respondent. 
I, Teresa Jones, Assistant to the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance, hereby 
certify that the record and transcripts filed herewith contain true and correct copies of the 
materials and documents maintained by the Idaho Department of Insurance as the agency record 
in the above entitled case, in accordance with Idaho Code § 67-5249. 
DATED this~lay of September 2010. 
STATE OF IDAHO 





Assistant to the Direct6r- .' 










I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this~day of September 2010 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing CERTIFICATE OF AGENCY RECORD to be served upon the 
following by the designated means: 
Scott McKay 
Robyn Fyffe 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
[8] first class mail 
D certified mail 
D hand delivery 
D via facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
John C. Keenan D first class mail 
Deputy Attorney General D certified mail 
Idaho Department of Insurance [8] hand delivery 
700 W. State St., 3rd Floor D via facsimile 
P.O. Box 83720 




TERESA JONES ..,;/ 
Assistant to the Director 












P.O. Box 2772 





Attomeys for Petitioner Two Jinn, Inc. 
SEP 30 2010
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In the Matter of: ) 
TWO JINN, INC.'s ) 
Request for Declaratory Ruling ) 




TWO JINN, INC, a Califomia corporation ) 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and ) 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and ) 
Anytime Bail Bonds; ) 
) 











Case No. CV-OC-201O-17486 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 
MOTION TO STAY FINAL 
AGENCY ORDER 
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I. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The Respondent Idaho Department of Insurance's ("DOl") interpretation of I.C. § 41­
1042 - as described in the DOl Director's Findings, Conclusions and Final Order on Request for 
Declaratory Ruling ("Final Order")l - is contrary to the statute's plain language and intemall y 
inconsistent. Accordingly, there is a strong likelihood that Petitioner Two linn, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Aladdin") will prevail on its petition for judicial review. Further, Aladdin will suffer irrepa~able 
injury if the Court denies the instant motion because it is unable to continue entering indemnity 
agreements during the bail transaction that provide for reimbursement for expenses incurred in 
attempting to re-capture a defendant in the event the defendant fails to appear in Court 
("apprehension costs"). The public's interest in ensuring the presence of criminal defendant~ in 
COUlt also suffers if Aladdin is no longer able to contract for the recovery of apprehension co;ts. 
In opposing Aladdin's motion, the DOl offers the same erroneous interpretation of I.e. § 
41-1042 that it presented to the Director, fails to provide a meaningful response to Two linn's 
assertion of in"eparable injury and fails to refute the manner in which the public interest will 
suffer absent a stay of the Final Order. The Court should therefore grant Aladdin's motion and 
stay the effectiveness of the Final Order pending the outcome of the petition for judicial review. 
A.	 Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
The third paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement for Surety Bail Bond (hereinafter 
"Indemnity Agreement" or "Paragraph Three"), which obligates the indemnitor (the criminal 
defendant and/or a third party guarantor) to agree to reimbursement of apprehension costs in the 
1 The agency record and transcripts were transmitted to the Court on September 29,2')10. 
See Certificate of Agency Record dated September 29, 2010. 
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event of breach, does not set forth charges for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction 
within the meaning of I.C'. § 41-1042. Further, the statute's provision permitting collateral 
reinforces that bail agents are permitted to contract for their remedies in the event of a breach of 
the bail bond. Accordingly, Aladdin is likely to prevail on the novel legal issue presented in the 
instant petition for review. 
1.	 Paragraph Three does not describe charges for the bail agent's service in the 
bail transaction 
Pursuant to I.e. § 41-1042(1), a bail agent must not charge or collect money or other 
valuable consideration from any person except to pay premiums, to provide collateral, and to 
reimburse the bail agent for certain enumerated expenses incurred in connection with the bail 
transaction. The 001 claims that I.e. § 41-1042 precludes Paragraph Three because it is "pa 1 of 
the bail transaction." Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Stay Final Agen:y 
Order ("DOl's Opposition"), p. 5. 
However, Section 41-1042 prohibits additional charges for the bail agent's "service in a 
bail transaction." I.e. § 41-1042(2). Regardless of whether it is signed during the bail 
transaction, Paragraph Three does not describe charges for the bail agent's senJice in that 
transaction. Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not apply to an agreement to pay the contingent 
recovery expenses set forth in that paragraph in the event there is a breach of that agreement. 
Unlike the breach remedies described in the Indemnity Agreement, a bail agent's service 
in the bail transaction includes tasks such as gathering information concerning a criminal 
defendant's background, ties to the community, family ties, criminal history, credit history, the 
financial wherewithal of all those involved as well as other relevant factors in evaluating the risk 
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posed by executing a particular bond. For their part, the consumer is required to pay the 
premium and to reimburse the bail agent for certain delineated expenses. Locating and 
apprehending a defendant who later absconds, which neither Aladdin nor its surety is legally 
obligated to do under the bail bond, is not part of the bai I agent's "service in a bail transactio 1." 
Rather, the services to which Section 41-1042 necessarily refers are those associated with selling 
the bail bond to the principal and effectuating his release from jail. 
2.	 The statute's collateral provision contemplates that bail agents will contract 
for their remedies in the event of breach at the time of the bail transactio'l 
The statute's express provision permitting bail agents to collect collateral to secure the 
bail bond contemplates that the parties may enter a contract identifying the available remedies in 
the event of a breach of the bail bond agreement. The DOl contends that the statute's collateral 
provision does not "necessarily contemplate[] expansion of' the definition of collateral to include 
contractual remedies to secure payment of apprehension costs. DOl's Opposition, p. 7. No 
"expansion" is suggested by Aladdin's argument. Section 41-1042 does not enumerate the 
promise to pay the forfeited bond as an allowable "charge" yet it is undisputed by the DOl th lt 
bail agents can require that promise. See Final Order, p. 7-8. The promise to pay apprehensicm 
costs is no different. Neilther promise to pay is an enumerated charge in Section 41-1042 because 
neither represents a charge for the bail agent's service during the bail transaction and the statute 
has no application to either remedy. 
The DOl acknowledges that a bail agent can require collateral to secure the bail bond but 
claims "the additional remedy [Aladdin] is seeking to secure in the form of 'Paragraph Three' is 
an attempt to collect other valuable consideration not permitted under" Section 41-1042. Del's 
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Opposition, p. 7. Collateral, however, is not a remedy but a means of satisfying a remedy. That 
collateral may be given to "secure the bail bond" does not limit application of such collateral to 
only payment of the forfeited bond but, rather, contemplates that collateral can be applied to 
redress damages caused by a criminal defendant's breach of the bail bond by failing to appear in 
court. 
The DOl's interpretation of Section 41-1042 is internally inconsistent as neither the 
promise to pay the bail bond in the event of forfeiture nor the promise to pay investigative costs 
is enumerated in Section 41-1042 as an allowable charge. The DOl's interpretation is contra'y to 
the statute's plain language and Aladdin is likely to prevail on the merits of the instant petiticn 
for review. 
B.	 Respective Risk of Injury to the Parties 
Because Aladdin has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits, it is 
required to demonstrate a lesser degree of irreparable injury to obtain a stay of the Director's 
Final Order. See Golden Gate Restaurant Ass 'n v. City alld County of San Francisco, 512 F. 3d 
1112.1116 (9th Cir. 2008) (the required degree of irreparable harm decreases as the probabilty 
of success increases). With that said, the degree of injury Aladdin will suffer if the Final Order 
remains effective pending the instant petition for review is significant and irreparable. 
Conversely, neither the DOl nor the public will be harmed by maintaining the status quo and 
entering a stay as requested by Aladdin. 
The DOl responds to this argument by broadly asserting no irreparable injury will flow if 
Aladdin is "compliant with the law" and that the Final Order will not force Aladdin to cease 
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apprehension efforts. DOl's Opposition, p. 7. Initially, whether compliance with the Final Clrder 
is necessary to comply with "the law" is at issue in the instant petition for review. As set forh 
above, I.e. § 41-1042 does not preclude the indemnity agreement utilized by Aladdin. In an;' 
event, the DO [' s assertion that compliance with the Final Order equates to compliance with' the 
law" is not responsive to Aladdin's arguments that it will suffer ilTeparable injury if the stay IS 
denied. 
The 001 further contends that Aladdin will not suffer ilTeparable injury because it "v. ill 
not be forced to cease apprehension efforts" and it can enter agreements providing for 
reimbursement of such expenses "outside the bail transaction." DOl's Opposition, p. 7. Thi:; 
position is unrealistic and does not refute Aladdin's assertion of ilTeparable injury. Although the 
Final Order does not require Aladdin to cease apprehension efforts, it precludes it from seeki 19 
reimbursement for the expenses associated with those efforts pursuant to an agreement enterEd at 
the time the bail bond is purchased. Aladdin can continue investigating the whereabouts of 
absconders and returning those absconders to COlu1 at its own expense or it can simply collee t 
the amount of the forfeiture from the indemnitor - a third party or the criminal defendant. nus, 
Aladdin's financial incentive to prevent the forfeiture from becoming final by sun-endering t~e 
defendant is significantly diminished. 
The DOl's claim that Aladdin can enter indemnity agreements regarding apprehension 
costs after the bail bond is purchased and the criminal defendant has disappeared ignores the 
realities of the situation. While Aladdin at times requires a third party indemnitor, the criminal 
defendant is always required to agree to pay apprehension costs. The suggestion that Aladdin 
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should locate an absconding criminal defendant and then convince that person to agree to 
reimbursement of investigative expenses caused by their breach is unrealistic and unreasonable. 
In arguing that a stay is warranted, Aladdin noted that neither the DOl nor the public will 
be injured by maintaining the status quo pending resolution of the instant petition for review. 
The DOl presents no argument in response and fails to identify any injury it will suffer if AI:::ddin 
is permitted to continue utilizing an indemnity agreement permitting the recovery of 
apprehension costs. Nor could it, particularly in light of Aladdin's acknowledgment that 
apprehension costs must not be excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond. See, e.~. 
I.e. ~ 41-1043 (collateral may not be excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond). 
Aladdin will suffer irreparable injury if the Final Order remains effective whereas the 
public and the DOl do not risk any comparable harm. The Court should grant the instant motion 
to stay. 
C.	 Public Interest 
Granting Aladdin's requested stay serves the public interest by ensuring the accused'~: 
presence in court. Conversely, if Aladdin can no longer recover apprehension costs, it has nCi 
financial incentive. or at least a significantly reduced financial incentive, to locate and return a 
criminal defendant to court, particularly considering that the law clearly allows it to recover the 
full amount of the forfeited bond. If Aladdin's only remedy is to obtain reimbursement for the 
entire forfeiture, as a maHer of sound business practice, it may choose to not pursue investigative 
efforts and simply collect payment of the entire forfeited bond. This result not only fails to 
protect the public, it thwarts the bail bond's purpose of ensuring the defendant's appearance in 
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The DOl provides no meaningful response to Aladdin's argument and, instead, simpl y 
indicates that compliance with its interpretation of I.e. § 41-1042 furthers the public interest in 
protecting consumers from unscrupulous and unfair practices. The DOl fails to explain how its 
interpretation addresses unscrupulous and unfair practices, especially given that bail agents are 
clearly permitted to collect collateral to secure the entire amount of the bail bond and 
reimbursement for apprehension expenses must not be excessive in relation to the face amount of 
the bond. 
Permitting Aladdin to continue entering indemnity agreements permitting the recovery of 
apprehension expenses furthers many of the public policy considerations at issue. Accordingly, 
the public interest lies in granting Aladdin the requested stay. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The instant petition for review presents a novel legal issue that has been the subject 0 0 
good-faith discussions with the DOl for a number of years. The plain language of the statute 
demonstrates a strong likelihood that Aladdin will succeed on the meJits and the financial ha om 
Aladdin will suffer if unable to recover apprehension costs is irreparable. A stay serves the 
public interest by providing bail agents and their surety with the financial incentive to locate md 
retlll11 absconding criminal defendants to court. It is therefore appropriate to maintain the status 
quo by staying the effectiveness of the Final Order pending judicial review. The C01ll1 shoulj 
grant the instant motion to stay. 
8 •	 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY 





DATED this :5 0 day of September, 2010. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Scott McKay
 
Attorneys for Two linn, Inc.
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I CERTIFY that on September~, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the fore~;oing 
document to be: 
mailed 
K hand delivered 
faxed 
to 
Mr. John C. Keenan 
Deputy Attol11ey General 
Idaho Depm1ment of Insurance 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0043 
~~ -------. 
Scott McKay -~ 
10 • REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY 
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OCT 04 2010 
.. ~VjO NA\UU'~;,/~~erk 
'1FPIJTY .... 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
In the Matter of: ) 
TWO JINN, INC.'s ) 
Request for Declaratory Ruling ) 
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042 ) 
) 
----- ­ ) 
) 
TWO JJNN, INC, a California corporation ) 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and ) 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and ) 













Case No. CV-OC-201O-17486 
ORDER GRANTING 
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO 
STAY FINAL AGENCY ORDER 
Petitioner Two Jinn, Inc., having moved the CouJ1 for its order staying enforcement of the 
Findings, Conclusions and Final Order on Request for Declaratory Ruling issued by the Idaho 
Department of Insurance on August 20,2010 in the matter styled In the Matter of Two linn, 
Inc. 's Requestfor Declaratory Ruling Regarding Idaho Code.~ 41-1042,001 Docket No. 18­
2579-09, and the Court having determined that good cause to grant the motion exists. IT IS 
ORDERED that enforcement of the Findings, Conclusions and Final Order on Request for 




.. \UU,J8Q, CI 










Declaratory Ruling is hereby STAYED pending resolution of Two linn's petition for judicial 
review of the same. 
DATED this~~_day of October, 2010. 
2 • ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY FINAL AGENCY ORDEI~ 
000056
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE-
A. Nature of the Case 
-	 This is a petition for judicial review of a final agency action of the Idaho Department of 
Insurance. Relief should be granted because the Director for the Idaho Department of Insumlce• 
erred by declaring that Idaho Code § 41-1042 precludes bail agents and their surety from entering 
• 
into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bail transaction which permits recovery of 
•	 apprehension costs later incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear as required in court. 
B. Procedural History 
• 
On December 10,2009, Petitioner Two linn, Inc., which does business in Idaho as 
•	 Aladdin and Anytime Bail Bonds (hereinafter "Two linn" or "Aladdin") petitioned the Idaho 
Department of Insurance (hereinafter "DOl") for a declaratory ruling pursuant to Idaho Code §
• 
67-5232(1) asking the DOl to declare that Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not preclude a bail agent 
• or its surety from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bai I transaction which 
permits the recovery of actual expenses later incurred in connection with the apprehension ard• 
surrender of a criminal defendant as a result of that criminal defendant's failure to appear in court 
• 
as required.	 R 1. 
The DOl assigned the matter to a hearing officer. R 53. The parties submitted briefs and 
stipulated to the relevant underlying facts and the hearing officer heard oral argument on March 
8,2010. R 1, 14,57; Transcript dated March 8, 2010. On April 1,2010, the hearing officer 
.t' issued her "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order" finding that Idaho 
- Code § 41-1042 precludes agreements providing for reimbursement of apprehension and 
























agent's service in a bail transaction. R 69. -
On April 14,2010, Aladdin filed a Petition for Review of Preliminary Order with the 
II_ 
Director of the DOl and a brief in support of this Petition. R. 83, 91. The DOl elected to nol 
submit further briefing. R 102. The Director heard oral argument on July 21, 2010. Transcript • 
dated July 21, 2010. On August 10,2010, the Director issued his Findings, Conclusions and 
• 
Final Order on Request for Declaratory Ruling ("Final Order"), which ordered that bail agent s 
•	 and sureties are precluded by Idaho Code § 41-1042 from entering into indemnity agreement~ for 
the reimbursement of apprehension costs contemporaneously with the bail transaction. R 10'), -
121. 
•	 Aladdin timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review with this C0U11 pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
84(m) and Idaho Code § 67-5270 on September 3,2010. Aladdin contemporaneously filed a 
motion to stay the Final Order and on October 4, 2010, following a hearing on Aladdin's moion 
• to stay, this Court entered an Order Granting Petitioner's Motion to Stay Final Agency Order 
pending resolution of Aladdin's petition for judicial review. • 
C. Statement of Fact~ 
• 
The facts below were uncontested and presented to the hearing officer at the hearing 01 
•	 March 8, 2010. Tr. pp. 6-7; also R 69-71, 110-111. Petitioner Two Jinn does business in the 
State of Idaho as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds. Tr. pp. 6-7. Two Jinn is licensed 
by the State of Idaho as a producer of bail surety insurance. ld. at 6. Danielson National 
Insurance Company (hereinafter "Danielson") is authorized as an- insurer by the State ofIdaho and 
Danielson's authorized lines of insurance include surety insurance. ld. Aladdin utilizes bail 























form entitled "Indemnity Agreement for Surety Bail Bond." [d.; R 11-13, 70, Ill. The Thirc -
Paragraph of this Indemnity Agreement requires the contracting parties: 
- THIRD: To reimburse [Aladdin] and Surety for actual expenses incurred and 
caused by a breach by the Principal of the terms for which the Application and Bail 
Bond were written, including all expenses or liabilities incurred as a result of• 
searching for, recapturing or returning Principal to custody, incurred by [Aladdin] 
or Surety or as necessary in apprehending or endeavoring to apprehend Principal, 
including legal fees incurred by [Aladdin] or Surety in making application to a • 
court for an order to vacate or to set aside the order of forfeiture or Judgment 
entered thereon. However, no expenses or liabilities incurred for recaptUling or 
returning Principal to custody shall be chargeable after the entry of Judgment.• 
R. 12,70.
• 
If an individual is arrested for an alleged criminal offense, the individual can be releas~d 
•	 from actual custody upon posting bail. R 70 citing Idaho Code § 19-2906. Bail may be posted by 
filing a bail bond, a propelty bond, or a cash deposit. R 70 citing Idaho Code § 19-2907(1) ar d 
• 
LC.R. 46(f)(1). If a bail bond is posted and the criminal defendant fails to appear for court as 
• ordered, the court wi II order the bai I forfeited. R 70 citing Idaho Code § 19-2915. Idaho Code § 
19-2914 empowers the surety insurance company or its bail agent to arrest the criminal defendant • 
anytime before the bail has been exonerated. R 70-71 citing Idaho Code § 19-2914. The 
• 
forfeiture of the bail is cxonerated if the climinal defendant is brought before the court within J 80 
days following the order forfeiting the bail. R 71 citing Idaho Code § 19-2922(5). 
-
The Third Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement allows Aladdin and Danielson to 
recover costs expended by them in apprehending and returning a criminal defendant to custody 
who has failed to appear in COUlt as required. R 71. The declaratory ruling issued by the DOl 
interpreting Idaho Code § 41-1042 prohibits Aladdin from utilizing its Indemnity Agreement 


















NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED that- a bail agent or surety is precluded by Idaho Code § 41-1042 from entering into 
indemnity agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs, such as the 
Indemnity Agreement, Exhibit A to the December 10,2009, letter request for- declaratory ruling, contemporaneous with the bail transaction, i.e. the writing of the 
bail bond, or from requiring any party to enter into such an indemnity agreement in 
order to maintain the validity of the bail bond. • 
R 121. 
• 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Should this Court reverse the Final Order because the DOl's declaration that Idaho Code §• 
41-1042 precludes Aladdin from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bail 
• 
transaction which permits collection of apprehension costs later incurred should a criminal 
• defendant fail to appear as required is unreasonable and prejudices Aladdin's substantial rights? 
IV. ARGUMENT
• 
A. The DOl's Declaration that Idaho Code § 41-1042 Prohibits Aladdin From Entering Into 8n 
Indemnity Agreement at the Time of the Bai I Transaction Which Permits Collection of• Apprehension Costs Shou:ld a Defendant Fail to Appear in Court is Unreasonable 
1. Standard of Review• 
An agency's decision may be overturned if it was: "(a) in violation of constitutional or 
• 
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unla,vful 
procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). 
The judiciary is free to correct errors of law in an agency's decision. Mercy Medical 
Centerv. Ada County, Bd. of: 146 Idaho 226, 229,192 P.3d 1050,1053 (2008); Love v. Bd. of -
County Comm'rs ofBingham County, 105 Idaho 558, 559,671 P.2d 471, 472 (1983).-
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four-prong test set forth in Simplot v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206-
(1991): (1) the court must determine whether the agency has been entrusted with the responsihility 
.,. 
to administer the statute at issue, (2) the agency's statutory construction must be reasonable, 0) 
the court must determine that the statutory language at issue does not treat the precise issue, ald-
(4) the court must ask whether any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are - present. See also Pearl v. Board ofProfessional Discipline of the Idaho State Board ofMedicine, 
137 Idaho 107, 113,44 P.3d 1162, 1168 (2002). Only if this test is met must the court give • 
"considerable weight" to the agency's interpretation. Pearl, 137 Idaho at 113,44 P.3d at 116g; 
• 
Simplot, 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219. 
•	 The ultimate responsibility to construe legislative language to determine the Jaw rests Nith 
the judiciary, and the underlying consideration whether or not such deference is granted is to 
• 
ascel1ain and give effect to legislative intent. Sons & Daughters of Idaho, Illc. v. Idaho, 144 Ijaho 
• 23,26, 156 P.3d 524,517 (2007); Simplot, 120 Idaho at 853-54,820 P.2d at 1210-11. "An agt:ncy 
construction will not be followed if it contradicts the clear expressions of the legislature becaL.se • 
'the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
• 
Congress.'" Simplot, 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 121, citing Chevron, U.S.A, Illc. 1'. Nature'! 
Resources Defellse Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-43 (1984). 
2.	 The DOl's Interpretation of Idaho Code ~ 41-1042 is Unreasonable Because tile 
Idaho Legislature Did Not Intend By this Statute to Limit a Bail Agent's Ability to 
Recover Apprehension Costs Pursuant to (Ill Indemnity in the Event ofa Breac,'l 
The first prong of the test set forth in Simplot is present in this case because the DOl is 
entrusted to administer the Insurance Code which includes Idaho Code § 41-1042. However, is -


















weight" because it is unreasonable. The DOl's interpretation of Section 41-1042 is unreasoncble -
because: (a) it is contrary to the plain language of this statute; (b) it is illogical and internally 
- inconsistent in that it pemlits bail agents to contract for one remedy in the event of breach - tte 
agreement to pay the forfeiture - but not contract for another remedy in the event of breach - I.he• 
agreement to pay apprehension costs, where neither remedy is enumerated in Section 41-1042; - and (c) it thwarts the purpose of bail by providing bail agents a perverse disincentive to locate 
absconders and instead simply to collect the forfeited bond from the indemnitor thus creating 
significant public safety issues. 
• 
The rules of statutory construction confirm Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not preclude 
•	 recovery of apprehension costs pursuant to an indemnity agreement. In interpreting a statute, the 
court first looks to the statute as written and determines whether the language is clear and
• 
unambiguous. State 1'. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). If it is, the 
• language of the statute is given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. State v. Burnight, 132 
Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless the • 
clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. 
• 
Driver v. S1 Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 427,80 P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003). If the language is ambiguous, 
cou11s mllst ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. See State v. Madden, 147 
Idaho 886, 888, 216 P.3d 644, 646 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard rules of statutory construction 
require deriving legislative intent by looking to the literal words of the statute, the content of those 
words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history. State v. Rhode, 133 Idat 0 -
459,462,988 P.2d, 645, 688 (1998). Further, "courts must construe a statute under the -










time the statute was passed." D & M Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Romriell, 138 Idaho -
160, 165,59 P.3d 965, 970 (2002). 
- The plain terms of Idaho Code § 41-1042 clearly and unambiguously apply to charges 
assessed in connection with a bail transaction. The Third Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement • 
does not set forth charges assessed in connection with the bail transaction and, instead, provides 
• 
for reimbursement of expenses in the event a contingency occurs - that is the criminal defendmt 
•	 fails to appear in court and thus breaches the terms for which the bail bond was written. Further, 
the standard rules of statutory construction, including legislative history and public policy, 
• 
confirm a legislative intent to allow bail agents to contract for the recovery of contingent losses, 
•	 including apprehension expenses, at the time of the bail transaction. 
a. The plain language of the statute does not preclude recovery of the breach
•	 remedy reflected in Aladdin's indemnity agreement. 
Idaho Code ~ 41-1042 provides: • 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a bail agent ill any 
bail transaction shall not, directly or indirectly, charge or collect money or • 
other valuable consideration from any person except for the following: 
(a) To pay premiums at the rates established by the insurer; • 
(b) To provide collateral; 
(c) To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incuned in 
connection with the bail transaction, limited to the following: 
(i) Expenditures actually and reasonably incuned to verify 
underwriting information or to pay for notary public fees; 
provided however, that the total of all such expenditures 
reimbursed shall not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00); and -
-
(ii) Travel expenses incuned more than twenty-five (25) 
miles from a bail agent's place of business, which includes 
any city or locality in which the bail agent advertises or 

















internal revenue service for business travel for the year in
 - which the travel occurs.
 
(2) Except as pennitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any - charge for his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully 
document all expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement. -	 (emphasis added). 
Section 41-1042 limits charges for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction and i;-
inapplicable to the Third Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement which obligates the indemnitor 
• 
(the criminal defendant and/or a third party guarantor) to agree to pay expenses that might be 
•	 incuned at a later date in the event the criminal defendant breaches the bail bond agreement by 
failing to appear in court as ordered and it becomes necessary to apprehend and return the 
• 
defendant to custody. The Third Paragraph does not describe charges for the bail agent's service 
•	 in the bail transaction and Section 41-1042 does not apply to the agreement to pay contingent 
recovery expenses set forth in that paragraph. This conclusion is reinforced by the statute's• 
express provision permitting bail agents to collect collateral to secure the bail bond, which 
• 
necessarily contemplates that the p<:l1ties may enter contracts describing remedies in the event of a 
breach of the bai I bond agreement. • 
i. The Thi rd Paragraph does not descri be charges for the bai J agent's servi ce i fl the 
bail transaction 
Idaho Code § 41-1042 prohibits a bail agent from "charg[ing] or collect[ingJ money 01 
other valuable consideration" in any bail transaction except to pay premiums, to provide colla:eral 
and to reimburse for certain enumerated expenses. This section only implicates charges for the 
bail agent's "service in a bail transaction." See Idaho Code § 41-1042(2) ("a bail agent shall fot-

















- A bail agent's service in the bail transaction includes tasks such as gathering informat on 
-
concerning a criminal defendant's background, ties to the community, family ties, criminal 
history, credit history, the financial wherewithal of all those involved as well as other relevanl 
• factors in evaluating the risk posed by executing a particular bond. The bail agent then negoti ates 
• 
the terms under which Aladdin is willing to execute the bai I bond, including requiring the 
defendant's participation in the supervised bail program, the provision of a third-party indemllitor 
• and collateral to secure the bond. The agreement to pay apprehension costs in the event of a 
• 
• 
breach by the principal as provided in the Third Paragraph does not describe charges for the bail 
agent's service in the bail transaction. Rather, the contingent costs described in this paragraph 
concem the remedy available to Aladdin and its surety following the bail transaction which is 
• 
• 
implicated only in those situations where the principal breaches his obligations by failing to 
appear as required in court 
That the Indemnity Agreement is entered into at the time of the bail transaction is of n J 
• import. See R 113 (Final Order, p. 5). The execution of the indemnity agreement at the time of 
• 
the bail transaction does not convert the contingent reimbursement set forth therein to "chargt[s] 
for the [bai I agent's1service in a bai 1 transaction" within the scope of Section 41-1042. InsteHd. 
regardless of the timing, the reimbursement set forth in the agreement concems contingent 
expenses unrelated to charges incurred during the bail transaction. 
Section 41-1042 clearly and unambiguously applies to charges assessed in connection with 
a bail transaction, i.e., issuing and posting a bail bond. The Third Paragraph of the Indemnity 
- Agreement does not set forth charges assessed in connection with the bail transaction and, instead, 
• 
• 
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-
- fails to appear in court. Thus, the plain language of Section 41-1042 does not preclude Aladdin 
from entering indemnity agreements such as that set forth in this paragraph at the time of the I>ai I 
- transaction. 
ii. The Third Paragraph does not constitute "valuable consideration" prohibitd by• 
the statute 
The DOl, also noted below that because the Third Paragraph constitutes a promise to pay • 
in the event of a breach, this at least constitutes "valuable consideration" not expressly permitted 
• 
by the statute. R 113-114 (Final Order. pp. 5-6). This argument is unavailing. 
•	 The Final Order acknowledges that a bail agent may contract with an indemnitor to be 
liable for the face amount in the event of breach. See R 119 (Final Order, p. 11) (positing 
• 
hypothetical where the "indemnitor wants to limit his losses to being liable for the face amount or 
•	 the bond as previollsl,v promised but does not want to also be responsible for attcmpted recovery 
costs." (emphasis added)). This prior promise, of course, is obtained at the time of the bail • 
transaction and the DOl does not assert this promise to pay the forfeited amount of the bond ill thc 
• event of breach constitutes "valuable consideration." A promise to pay apprehension costs in the 
event of a breach cannot constitute "valuable consideration" prohi bited by the statute if a promise • 
to pay the face amount of the bond in the event of breach does not. 
Further, it could be argued that innumerable matters associated with the Indemnity 
Agreement uti lized by Aladdin or other bai I agents constitute "valuable consideration" not -
described in Section 41-1042. For instance, bail agents require the principal to promise to apI=ear -
-
in court as ordered, may require a third-party relative to sign an indemnity agreement in additi,)n 
















to check in with the bail agent at specified times to ensure the principal is meeting his or her -
obligations. See R 111-112 (Final Order, pp. 3-4) ("[I]t is not uncommon for a bail agent and 
- surety to require additional conditions beyond the fundamental requirement to appear at all 
,. required court hearings as part of the issuance of the bail bond. Additional requirements can 
include requiring the principal to periodically check in with the bail agents."). The DOl does not 
• 
dispute the appropriateness of such consideration even though none of the foregoing are 
•	 specifically enumerated in the statute.' 
Nor should the DOl assert otherwise. None of the foregoing including a promise to p<: y 
• 
the forfeited amount of the bond constitute a "charge" or attempt to "collect money or other 
•	 valuable consideration" in the bail transaction. 
However, to the extent that the contingent agreement descri bed in the Third Paragraph is
• 
"valuable consideration" charged in a bail transaction, it is a form of collateral expressly perrr:itted 
• by Idaho Code ~ 41-1042(l)(b). "Collateral" means "property of any kind given as security te 
obtain a bail bond." Idaho Code § 41-1038(2). Black's Law Dictionary defines "collateral 
security" as "a security, subordinate to and given in addition to a primary security, that is interlded 
• 
to guarantee the validity or convertibility of the primary security." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1090 (7(11 ed. 2000). When a principal or third party indemnitor agrees to pay 
expenses in the event of forfeiture of the bond as set f0l1h in Paragraph Three, that agreement is 
given as security to obtain a bail bond and to guarantee the validity of the principal's promise :0 
... 
, Indeed, counsel for the DOl staff agreed that many of the provisions contained in 
Aladdin's Indemnity Agreement are acceptable including requiring the criminal defendant to 
provide a third-party indemnitor who agrees to pay the bail bond in the event the defendant f<:ils -
to appear and requiring the defendant to agree to appear for all coul1 appearances and to 
















appear as ordered by the court. Thus, if the Third Paragraph is "valuable consideration" char~;ed-
-
in a bail transaction, it falls squarely within the definition of collateral and is permissible purslant 
to Idaho Code § 41-1042(1)(b). 
• b. Section 41-1042's collateral provision further demonstrates that the DOl's 
interpretation of lthis statute is unreasonable 
- Idaho Code § 41-1042 permits bail agents to "collect money or other valuable 
• 
consideration" to "provide collateral." Idaho Code. § 41-1042(l)(b). As cited above, Title 4J 
defines "collateral" as "property of any kind given as security to obtain a bail bond." Idaho C)de 
• § 41-1038(2). This collateral may not be excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond, 
• 
• 
Idaho Code § 41-1043. Thus, rather than precluding a bail agent from contracting for remedies in 
the event of a breach of the criminal defendant's obligations under the bait bond, Section 41-1042 
expressly contemplates the existence of such remedies by permitting bail agents to take collakral 
- from the consumer to protect against contingent losses. 
• 
A statute must not be construed in a way which makes mere surplusage of provisions 
included therein. Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568,571-72,798 P.2d 27,30-31 (1990). If 
• contingency agreements were barred by Section 41-1042 and bail agents were precluded from 
requiring a criminal defendant or others to be responsible for expenses in the event of the bail's 
forfeiture, there would be no need for collateral. Thus, to interpret Section 41-1042 as precluding 
.~ bail agents from entering into indemnity agreements at the time of the bail transaction would 











- Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not limit the remedies available in the event of a breach of the 
-
bail bond nor does it limit the losses to which collateral may be applied in the event of a breach. 2 
While the collateral must not be excessive in relation to the bond amount and there are 
.. requirements regarding how it is handled,3 there is no limitation placed on a bail agent's ability to 
- apply this collateral towards a duly contracted for loss such as a forfeited bail bond or the costs of apprehending a criminal defendant in order to prevent the forfeiture. 
• 
.. 
i. The DOI"s acknowledgment that a bail agent may contract for one remedy in 
the event of breach - the agreement to pay the forfeiture - but not to contract for 
another remedy in the event of breach - the agreement to pay apprehension costs, 
where neither remedy is enumerated in Section 41-1042, is unreasonable and 
illogical 
• The Final Order acknowledges that the collateral, which a bail agent is permitted to collect 
• 
• 
under Section 41-1042(1)(b), is to secure the bail bond in the event offorfeiture.-l R 116. As 
previously noted, the Final Order also acknowledges that an indemnitor's liability for the face 
amount of the bond may occur pursuant to the prior agreement of the parties. R 111.5 The DOl's 
.. position is illogical. Section 41-1042 cannot be read to permit bail agents to contract for payment 
• C Paragraph Eight of the Indemnity Agreement utilized by Aladdin provides that any 
collateral collected may be applied to the obligations, liabilities, losses, costs, damages and 
expenses specified in the Agreement. R 12. 
3For example, collateral must be deposited and maintained in a separate trust account if 
collateral is received in the form of cash or in a separate and secure location apalt from the btlil 




-l Similarly, the Director at the July 21, 2010 hearing acknowledged that a bail agent may 
apply collateral towards the amount of the forfeited bail bond ­ a position that the DOl has taken 
throughout these proceedings. Tr. p. 15, I. 7 - p. 16, I. 8. 
5 See Final Order, p. 11 (positing hypothetical where the "indemnitor wants to limit his 
losses to being liable for the face amount of the bond as previously promised but does not want to 















of the entire bail bond but prohibit agents from contracting for reimbursement of apprehension..• 
expenses incurred in order to avoid payment of the entire bail bond. 
This interpretation is internally inconsistent as neither the promise to pay the bail bond in 
the event of forfeiture nor the promise to pay investigative costs is enumerated in Section 41-l042• 
as an allowable charge. Instead, Section 41-1042 has no application to either remedy because 
• 
neither represents a charge for the bail agent's service during the bail transaction. Accordingly, 
the DOl's interpretation is contrary to the statute's plain language, unreasonable and not entitled• 
to deference. 
• 
c. The Idaho Legislature would not have adopted a statute that thwarted the 
purpose of bail and created grave public safety issues 
• 
The public policy underlying bail bonds and encouraging the return of fugitives to cusody, 
.. 
existing Idaho case law, the legislative history of Idaho Code *41-1042 and authority from other 
jurisdictions throughout the United States all establish that bail agents are entitled to contract for.. 
the fair and reasonable value of costs inculTed in connection with apprehending and surrendering 
• 
a principal to the court's custody. Recognizing bail agents' ability to recover such costs fllrthl~rs 
the public policy underlying bail bonds by promoting the defendant's appearance in cOllrt and 
promotes public safety. Thus, even if the language of Section 41-1042 is ambiguous as to 
whether it limited remedies pursuant to an indemnity agreement, which it is not, standard rule~ of 






















i. Permitting the recovery of apprehension costs is consistent with the purpose of- bail and public policy which encourages the return of fugiti ves to custody 
- Prohibiting bail agents such as Aladdin from recovering expenses incurred in recaptur ng 
and surrendering a defendant is contrary to public policy and creates significant public safety 
• 
issues. The primary purpose of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused. State v. Quick 
•	 Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 655, 167 P.3d 788, 792 (Ct. App. 2007). Bail agents havl~ the 
authority, and in fact are encouraged, to arrest a defendant who has missed a court appearance and 
• 
return him to court. See Idaho Code § 19-2914 (at any time before the exoneration of bail, thE: 
•	 surety insurance company or its bail agent ... may empower any person of suitable age and 
discretion to arrest the defendant at any place within the state"); Idaho Code § 19-2922 ("court 
• 
shall order the bail exonerated: if the "defendant has appeared before the COUlt within one hundred 
•	 eighty (180) days of the court's order of forfeiture"); r.C.R. 46(h) (permitting court to set asidE 
forfeiture if it appears that j us1 ice does not require its enforcement after consideration of seve] al• 
factors including "the participation of the person posting bail in locating and apprehending thE: 
defendant"). 
The purpose of bail is served by providing the surety a financial incentive to locate • 
absconders and return them to the court. See County BOTzding Agency v. State, 724 So.2d 131 
133 (Fla. App. 1998) ("The purpose of [a Florida statute permitting exoneration when the SurEty 
has substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant] is 
to create a financial incentive for sureties to locate and apprehend fugitives"); Board of Com '1.'; of-




















- forfeiture statutes in favor of sureties provides incentives to sureties "to pursue those who flee the 
-
jurisdiction"). 
It is axiomatic that there are costs associated with locating and apprehending absconding 
criminal defendants. Further, it is not disputed that Aladdin can seek reimbursement for the • 
amount of a bail bond forfeiture. However, if Aladdin could not recover investigation costs, ~'et- could recover the amount of the forfeited bond, it has no financial incentive to locate and retu 11 a 
criminal defendant to court. In such circumstances, the criminal fugitive remain free and pub ic 
safety is compromised. Such a result is contrary to the bail bond's purpose of ensuring the 
• 
defendant's appearance in court and cannot be what the Idaho Legislature intended. 
•	 FUlther, the criminal defendant and his indemnitor's obligation under the Third Paragraph 
provide an important incentive to the defendant to appear for court. If the criminal defendant• 
knows that neither he nor his indemnitors, often family or friends, will be financially responsi )Ie 
• in the event he absconds, he is more likely to skip bail. Similarly, if the indemnitors are 
financially responsible if the defendant skips bails, they have a financial incentive to assist the • 
defendant in making it to court or to assist the bail agents in effectuating the defendant's surrender 
• 
should he fail to do SO.6 
(, It also must be noted that the expense of apprehending and returning the principal to the ,- court is often less than the actual bond amount. In this instance, the indemnitor is better served 
by funding the costs of apprehension and return of the criminal defendant as opposed to payirlg 














a.) The DOl's suggestion that apprehension cost be negotiated after th(~ 
breach has occurred is unrealistic and harmful to both the public and the 
consumer 
The Final Order asserts that a bai I agent should negotiate recovery of apprehension co;ts 
• 
• 
after the breach has occurred. R 118-119 ("By permitting a bail agent to seek to enter into a new 
transaction, albeit related to the bail transaction, for recovery of the principal including the 
reimbursement of recovery and apprehension costs, the goals of encouraging recovery and 
• ensuring the presence of the defendant at court hearings are preserved."). The DOl's assertioll in 
• 
• 
this regard is unrealistic and harmful to the public and the consumer. 
In a bail transaction, there is often no third party indemnitor and, thus, it is only the 
criminal defendant who agrees to be responsible for the forfeited bond. Of course, no bail agEnt is 
• 
• 
going to investigate an absconding defendant's whereabouts for the purpose of negotiating thE 
recovery of investigative expenses with that defendant - and no absconding defendant is going to 
agree to reimbursement of expenses already incurred absent a prior agreement. In these scenmios, 
• the bail agent will let the forfeiture stand, particularly when there is collateral to secure the bail 
bond or adequate assets against which ajudgment can be collected. In those instances, the bail 
agent will have no incentive to return the fugitive to custody and the purpose of bail is thwarted. 
Additionally, the parties should negotiate the liability and breach remedies relating to the 
bail transaction on one occasion, just as with any other transaction. In no forum are breach 
remedies negotiated after the breach has occurred. It would be altogether impractical and 
unproductive for the parties to a car loan, a construction project or any other commercial 
transaction to come together after a breach has occurred and attempt to agree to the remedies hr 











- sit down at the table again after the breach has occurred and work out the breach remedies 
including the apprehension costs the indemnitor will pay. A bail agent who can simply collect the 
- face amount of the bond from that indemnitor is unlikely to undertake the time and expense 0' 
- attempting to negotiate the recovery of apprehension expenses after a defendant has failed to 
- appear. Under this scenanio, the fugitive remains free to the detriment of the general public a~ well as the consumerlindemnitor who financially benefits from payment of lower apprehension 
• costs rather than the full penal sum of the bond. 
• 
b.) The DOl's concern over protecting the bail consumer from 
unreasonable investigation costs is not compelling. 
• 
The DOl's apparent concern involves the risk that bail bond consumers may be subjected 
to unfair practices and, speci fically, the risk that a consumer may unknowingly be held liable (or 
• unreasonable apprehension costs. See, e.g. R 120 (Final Order, p. 12) ("The fact the charge is 
• latent and conditional does not necessarily assist the consumer or relieve the need to protect a 
consumer. Rather, it is more critical to protect the consumer where significant investigative 01' 
• 
apprehension fees and expenses may be incurred when the consumer is not aware of the likelihood 
• and is focused only on obtaining the defendant's release fromjail."). This concem is 
unpersuasl ve. 
-
Initially, Aladdin is unaware of any allegation that it has attempted to collect unreasofllble 
apprehension fees. Indeed, Aladdin is already of the view that apprehension costs must not be 
excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond. See, e.g. Idaho Code § 41-1043 (collateral 











that in the legislative history underlying Section 1042, there were very few complaints concerning
• 
bail bonds and of those complaints, most involved the handling of collateral. R. 114. 
- The DOl agrees that Aladdin can require an indemnitor to post collateral at the time of the 
bail transaction to secure the entire amount of the bail bond. An additional promise - secured or• 
unsecured -	 to reimburse Aladdin for apprehension expenses incurred in returning an absconder - to court does not expose the defendant or his indemnitor to any additional risk of injury, 
•	 particularly where the total liability is limited by the face amount of the bond. Indeed, such 
agreements protect the consumer and as discussed above serve a compelling public interest by 
• 
providing Aladdin and other bail agents with an incentive to re-capture the defendant and obtain 
•	 exoneration of the bond, rather than simply letting the forfeiture stand and collecting the entin~ 
amount of the bond from the indemnitor or defendant. Further, an indemnitor is better served by
• 
funding the costs of apprehension and return of the criminal defendant as opposed to paying the 
• higher cost of a forfeited bond. 
The Final Order discusses two circumstances in which an indemnitor may prefer not tel• 
agree to reimburse apprehension costs notwithstanding these concems: (I) the indemnitor believes 
• 
that he will have a better chance or convincing the defendant to appear or sUITender or (2) the 
indemnitor believes that searching for the defendant would be futile so wants to limit his liahi,ity 
to the face amount of the bond. R 119. 
Preliminarily, the oveniding consideration should not be the preference of an indemnitor 
II. who has contractually agreed to pay apprehension costs in the event of a breach to not be 
responsible for those costs after the breach has occurred. This indemnitor is often the criminal -





















to custody. Further, this indemnitor had a choice whether to engage the services of a bail agent 
and which bail agent to use. In Aladdin's case, Aladdin requires that this indemnitor agree th;lt if 
there is a breach of the bail agreement, then the indemnitor is contractually liable to pay as a 
remedy for that breach the actual and reasonable apprehension expenses incurred in returning the • 
principle who is now a criminal fugitive to custody. The more important policy consideration is - returning the criminal fugitive to custody which is accomplished by upholding the terms of 
•	 Aladdin's Indemnity Agreement. 
However, even the DOl's two hypothetical circumstances do not present significant ri~:k 
• 
for the bail bond consumec With respect to the first circumstance, Aladdin and other bail agents 
•	 should as a matter of sound business practice attempt to utilize the least intrusive investigativt: 
tactics to secure the surrender of the defendant, including contacting the indemnitor and
• 
requesting his assistance in convincing the defendant to self-sun·ender. If they do not and pur:;uc 
• collection of unreasonable apprehension cots, that consumer has a defense to payment of these 
costs. See, e.g. Saladino I'. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 39 A.D.2d 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), (holding • 
bail agent was entitled to recover expenses incurred in apprehending principal pursuant to 
• 
indemnity agreement provided such expenses are the fair and reasonable; $4,000 investigator I"ec 
- was unreasonable as the principal was residing with his wife without any attempt at concealm(~nt 
and working at his regular employment). The second circumstance identified by the DOl is 
addressed by Idaho Code.;~ 41-1043 which limits an indemnitor's liability for the forfeiture ard 
apprehension costs. 
Finally, the DOl expresses concern over the fact that family and friends are sometimes -














- these transactions sometimes take place outside of normal business hours. R 114 (Final Orde~, p. 
6). As set forth above, the overriding policy consideration notwithstanding the possible - involvement of family in obtaining the bond should be the return of an absconding criminal 
•	 defendant to custody. Further, most significant bonds are not posted at night. The typical bond 
for a felony is determined by a judge during the day and the bail transaction is accomplished- during business hours. See Idaho Criminal Rules 4,5 and 46(c). Bonds posted at night are 
•	 generally for misdemeanors pursuant to a set schedule and the penal sum of the bonds for 
misdemeanors are generally far less than for felonies. See Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 13. 
• 
Additionally, the DOl acknowledges that it is appropriate for a bail agent to obtain collateral in 
• connection with a bail bond and that collateral sometimes includes an indemnitor's home. Ar 
additional promise to reimburse bail agents for apprehension expenses incuITed in the event 0' a• 
breach does not dramatically alter the nature of the transaction and as previously discussed. often 
• 
works to the significant advantage of the consumer by providing bail agents a financial incent ve 
•	 to return an absconder to court instead of simply letting the forfeiture stand and collecting the 
entire amount of the bond from that indemnitor. 
• 
ii. Permitting the Recovery of Apprehension Costs is Consistent with the 
Legislative History of Idaho Code *41-1042 
-
In addition to the plain language ofIdaho Code § 41-1042 and its underlying public policy, 
this statute's legislative history establishes that the Idaho Legislature did not intend to precludl~ 
indemnity agreements permitting the recovery of apprehension costs such as that contained in the 
Third Paragraph. Prior to passing Idaho Code § 41-1042, the House Business Committee was 















bail bond on behalf of another could lose that collateral in the event the bail bond was forfeited.
• 
The Committee minutes reflect the following: 
- Rep. Douglas presented an example of parents pledging title to their home as 
collateral for a bond to bail out their child from jail, and asked whether the parents 
•	 would lose their home if the child skips bail. Mr. Duvall [charter president of the 
Professional Bail Agents of Idaho] said that this would be the case. 
- H 62, February 11, 2003 House Business Committee Minutes.7 
Because the obligation to pay the bail bond only arises upon forfeiture, an agreement tJ .. 
pay that forfeiture necessarily arises as part of a separate indemnity agreement. Although Idaho 
• Code § 41-1042 does not explicitly permit recovery of a forfeited bond, such recovery is 
permissible because reimbursement for a forfeited bond is not a charge assessed in connectior
• 
with the boil transaction. 8 Similarly, although Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not explicitly permit 
• reimbursement for expenses incurred in apprehending and surrendering a criminal defendant, such 
reimbursement is also permissible pursuant to an indemnity agreement. It is nonsensical to • 
interpret Section 4 J-1042 as permi tting bai I agents to contract through an indemni ty agreemer t for .. 
the recovery of a forfeited bond but forbidding bai I agents from contracting through an indemnity 
• 




8 Again, the DOl readily acknowledges that the bail agent may recover the forfeited bond
 
amount from the indemniltor pursuant to a prior agreement. Final Order, pp. 8, 11 (R 116, Il ~,);
 
Transcript from the July 21,2010 hearing before the Director for the DOL Tr. 15, I. 7 - Tr. 16, I.
 
6; see, also remarks by counsel for DOl at March 8, 2010 hearing (acknowledging that
 
"collateral" which the bail agent is permitted to collect during the bail transaction is to secure the
 
bail bond) Tr. p. 24, In. 4-5; (discussing loss of collateral posted by third patty indemnitor when
 




secure that bond" has a stake in returning an absconder to court); Tr. 22, In. 1-8; and (arguing
 
that collateral is about securing the bond because Section 41-1043 connects collateral to the
 




















































types of contingent losses to which collateral may be applied. 
iii. The Idaho Supreme Court has Recognized the Propriety of Bail Agents 
Recovery of Expenses Pursuant to an Indemnity Agreements 
Courts must assume that the legislature knew of all legal precedent when passing a statute. 
D & M Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 138 Idaho at 165,59 P.3d at 970. Idaho Code § ,0­
1042 was passed in 2003, years after the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that bail agents ma/ 
recover expenses pursuant to the terms of an indemnity agreement in Martin v. Lyons, 98 Ida~o 
102, 105, 558 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1977). 
In Lyons, a third party entered into an indemnity agreement with the bail bond company 
and later disputed its liability under this agreement. ld. The court determined the indemnific<tion 
clause at issue was reasonably read as allowing the bail agents to be indemnified for "voluntary" 
disbursements. ld. The Court reasoned that bail agents can recover consistent with the terms of 
the indemnity agreement. Id. ("[I]f the indemnification clause agreed to by [the indemnitor] <Ind 
[the bail agents] allows indemnification for payments that are not legally required of the bail 
agents, then [the indemnitor] would be so obligated inespective of whether the forfeiture of [t le 
Principal's] bail was valid or invalid.") Because the legislature knew that the Idaho Supreme 
Court had acknow ledged that bai I agents could recover voluntary disbursements pursuant to 
indemnity agreements when it passed Idaho Code § 41-1042, and did not state the law should Je 
otherwise, it is presumed that such recovery is sti 11 allowed. If this was not the case, the 

















- iv. The DOl's Position Regarding the Recovery of Apprehension Costs is No\el and Unsupported by Authority from Other Jurisdictions 
- The DOl's attempt to limit a bail agent's ability to contract for the recovery of 
- apprehension costs in the event of a later breach by a criminal defendant is novel and unsuppcrted by authority from other jUlisdictions. 
- In Saladino v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 39 A.D.2d 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), a bail agent 
sought to recover, pursuant to an indemnity agreement, a $4,000 fee paid to a licensed investigator 
-
to apprehend and surrender the principal to custody. 39 A.D.2d at 765. The principal failed to 
appear at two court dates, thus the bail agent hired an investigator to locate him. Id. The COUlt 
• 
held that under the broad language of the indemnity agreement, the baiJ agent was entitled to 
recover expenses incurred in recapturing and surrendering the principal, provided such expemes 
are the fair and reasonable value of services rendered. 9 Id. However, because the principal was 
residing with his wife without any attempt at concealment and working at his regular employment, 
a $4,000 investigator fee was unreasonable. Id. As such, the court granted a new trial to 
determine the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered. Id. The Saladil/o coul1 
'. provided: 
While it may be that large contingent fee retainers are customary 
and are necessary in many cases to obtain effective results, there is 
no apparent reason why a surety should not first mount a more 
modest, superficial investigation such as would have been adequate 





9 Similar to Idaho Code § 41-1042, N.Y. Insurance Law § 6804, which sets forth the 




















Under the broad language of the indemnity agreement executed by - [third party signor], [the bail agent] is entitled to reimbursement for 
expenses in connection with the apprehension of the principal. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In fact, it is a common practice throughout the United States for bail agents to utilize • 
indemnity agreements to contract for reimbursement of expenses in the event of a breach by tile 
• 
criminal defendant. See, e.g. Hernandez v. USA Bail Bonds, 1999 WL 740441 (Tex. Ct. App. 
•	 1999) (unpublished) (affirming settlement between bail bond company and third party 
indemnitors who "executed contracts to indemnify in which they agreed to act as sureties for Ibai I-
amount], plus all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in apprehending [principal] in the 
•	 event [prinicipal] forfeited his bond"); Campbell v. AAA Bail Bonds. Inc., 879 N.E.2d 1229, 
2008 WL 187968, (Ind.App.2008) (unpublished) (finding AAA acted as authorized agent when 
• 
executing the indemnity agreement and therefore able to recover under the agreement for cost~;, 
• expenses and fees incuned by AAA in returning defendant to custody); and Calamita v. DePonte, 
122 Conn. 20,187 A. 129 (1936) (action arising out of indemnity agreement where defendant~;• 
agreed to indemnify bail bond sureties for damages and costs incurred by sureties because of 
• 
accLlsed's default). 
Many states also have codified the foregoing practice. See., e.g. Nevada (N.R.S. 
697.300(5) providing for reimbursement or right of action "against the principal or any 
indemnitor, for actual expenses incurred in good faith, by reason of breach by the defendant of any 
.- of the terms of the written agreement under which and pursuant to which the undertaking of b::il 
or bail bond was written"); Utah (UC.A. 1953 31A-35-608 providing bail bond businesses the <. 





















- reason of breach by the defendant of the bail bond agreement); Missouri (V.A.M.S. 374.719 
providing bai I bond agents with the authority to use collateral to reimburse costs in case of failure 
-
 to appear for reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred); Delaware (18 Del.e. Section 43n, 
• DE ST TI Section 18 Sectiion 4347 providing surety insurance contracts for bail bond agents tJ 
- reimburse the bail agent personally, or permit the bail agent to have a right of action against the defendant or any indemnitor, for actual expenses incurred in good faith, by reason of breach by the 
- defendant of any of the terms of the written agreement); California (10 CCR Section 2081 
- providing bail licensee the right to reimburse himself for actual reasonable and necessary 
expenses incuned and caused by a breach by the anestee of any of the terms of the written 
• agreement under which and pursuant to which the undertaking of bailor the bail bond was 
• 
written); and Arkansas (AR ADC 166.00.001-23 provides bail bond businesses the right to de:luct 
from the collateral reasonable expenses incun-ed due to a breach of the bail bond contract). 
• 
In facL the undersigned has been unable to locate authority from other jurisdictions which 
• forbid a bail agent from entering into indemnity agreements at the time of the bai I transaction 
which permit recovery of this contingent loss. The DOl's interpretation of an Idaho statute as 
• 
forbidding this is novel and altogether inconsistent with the statutory, regulatory and case la\V~ of 
other.i urisdictions throughout the United States. 
The public policy underlying bail bonds and encouraging the return of fugitives to custJdy, 
existing Idaho case law, the legislative history of Idaho Code § 41-1042 and overwhelming 
authority from other states all establish that bail agents are entitled to contract for the fair and 
















- to the court's custody. Recognizing bail agents' ability to recover such costs furthers the pub ic 
policy underlying bail bonds by promoting a criminal defendant's appearance in court. 
- B. Substantial Rights of Aladdin Are Prejudiced By the DOr's Declaratory Ruling
 
Substantial rights of Aladdin have been prejudiced by the declaratory ruling of the DCI.
• 
See Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this 
• 
section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been 
•	 prejudiced.") The declaratory ruling reflected in the DOl's Final Order was issued in respons,~ to 
the request for declaratory ruling sought by Aladdin. R 109 (Final Order); R 1 (Aladdin's request
• 
for declaratory ruling). This declaratory ruling specifically concerns the Indemnity Agreement for 
•	 Surety Bail Bond utilized by Aladdin to transact business and forbids Aladdin "from entering into 
indemnity agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs, such as the Indemnity 
• 
Agreement, Exhibit A to the December lO, 2009, letter request for declaratory ruling, 
• contemporaneous with the bail transaction ...." R 109, 121 (Final Order); R 11-13 (lndemnit~' 
Agreement). Aladdin is financially harmed by this declaratory ruling which prohibits Aladdin • 
from seeking reimbursement of apprehension costs it incurs in apprehending a criminal defendant 
• 
who has failed to appear illl COllrt as required pursuant to the terms of its Indemnity Agreement 
executed at the time of the bail transaction .. Thus, Aladdin's substantial rights are prejudiced by 
this declaratory ruling. 
V. CONCLUSION 
,- Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Final Order because the DOl's 
declaration that Idaho Code § 41-1042 precludes Aladdin from entering into an indemnity 





















- incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear as required is unreasonable and prejudices 
Aladdin's substantial rights. 
- It.~ 
.. 
Respectful1y submitted this ~ day of December, 2010. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT:"'LP 
.. 
By ~-zr~---
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 II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. • 
- The Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance entered his Final Order on August 20,
 2010, stating therein that a bail agent or surety is precluded from entering into indemnity
 
agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs, such as the Indemnity Agreement,
 • 
attached as	 Exhibit A to Two linn's letter of December 20, 2009 [R., p. 12], contemporaneous 
• 
with the bail transaction in accordance with Idaho Code § 41-1042. R., p. 121. The Petitioler 
..	 on appeal seeks reversal of the Director's Final Order and asks this Court to find that section ,n­
1042, Idaho Code, permits bail agents and their surety to enter into indemnity agreements at the 
same time as the bail transaction. For the reasons set forth below, the Department asks that the 
•	 Director's Final Order be affirmed in its entirety. 
B. Procedural Hi:~tory.• 
The Respondent agrees with the Procedural History of this case as stated in Petitioner's 
•	 Opening Brief, pp. 1-2. 
C. Statement of Facts.-
-
The Respondent does not contest the Findings of Fact as stated in the Hearing Officer's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order dated April 1, 2010, or in 1he 
Director's Findings, Conclusions and Final Order on Request for Declaratory Ruling. R., pp. 60­-
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A. The Focus of the Inquiry Is the Interpretation of Idaho Code § 41-1042. 
• 
Section 41-1042, Idaho Code reads as follows: 
..	 41-1042. COLLECTIONS AND CHARGES PERMITTED. (1) Notwithstanding 
any other provision of this chapter, a bail agent in any bail transaction shall not, 
directly or indirectly, charge or collect money or other valuable consideration 
•	 from any person except for the following: 
- (a) To pay premiums at the rates established by the insurer; (b)	 To provide collateral; 
•	 (c) To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incurred in connection with 
the bail transaction, limited to the following: 
(i)	 Expenditures actually and reasonably incurred to verify 
underwriting information or to pay for notary public fees, 
recording fees, or necessary long distance telephone or telegram
•	 fees:; provided however, that the total of all such expenditures 
reimbursed shall not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00); and 
•	 (ii) Travel expenses incurred more than twenty-five (25) miles from a 
bail agent's place of business, which includes any city or locality 
in which the bail agent advertises or engages in bail business, up to •	 the amount allowed by the internal revenue service for business 
travel for the year in which the travel occurs. 
- (2) Except as pennitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any charge 
for his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully document all 
- expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement. 
Idaho Code § 41-1042 (underscore here). -	 When interpreting a section of the Idaho Code, this Court: 
exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. . .. Where- the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to 
the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. . .. The 
• 
• 





















•	 language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning.... 
If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to 
resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. . .. When this 
•	 Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the 
legislative intent and give effect to that intent. ... To ascertain the intent of the 
legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the 
_	 context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative 
history.... It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which 
will not render it a nullity. . .. Constructions of a statute that would lead to an 
-	 absurd result are disfavored.... 
State v. Beavers, -- Idaho --, -- P.3d --, (Ct.App. December 8, 2010) (36183, 36191(1DCCR)) 
- (citations omitted). 
The Department believes that section 41-1042 is plain and unambiguous: in any tail
• 
transaction, a bail agent may not directly or indirectly charge or collect money or any other .. consideration except to pay set premiums, provide collateral, and reimburse for enumeraled 
expenses set out in the statute. Section 41-1042(1). The bail agent's charges for his service are 
• 
limited to section 41-1042. Section 41-1042(2). 
•	 B. The "Bail Transaction" Includes the Indemnity Agreement "Third Paragraph." 
At the core of this controversy is the indemnity agreement that is embedded in 1he • 
Petitioner's and Surety Danielson National Insurance Company's bail form identified as "Exhibit 
A," attached in Petitioner's letter of December 10, 2009. R., p. 12. It is identified by 1he 
- Petitioner as the "Third Paragraph" and reads as follows: 
THIRD: To reimburse Second Party [Petitioner] and Surety for actual expenses 
incurred and caused by a breach of the Principal of any of the terms for which the - application and Bail Bond were written, including all expenses or liabilities 
incurred as a result of searching for, recapturing or returning Principal to custody, 
incurred by Second Party or Surety or as necessary in apprehending or- endeavoring to apprehend Principal, including legal fees incurred by Second Party 
or Surety in making application to a court for an order to vacate or to set aside the 
• 
























order of	 forfeiture of Judgment thereon. However, no expenses or liabilities • incurred for recapturing or returning Principal to custody shall be chargeable after 
the entry of Judgment. 
• 
R., p. 12	 (hereinafter "Third Paragraph"). In sum, the Third Paragraph provides that the 
•	 indemnitor shall pay for all of Petitioner's expenses or liabilities incurred for searchi 19, 
recapturing or returning the principal to authorities. In other words, the Petitioner is seek ng 
• 
reimbursement from an indemnitor for expenses related to apprehension of a principal tlat 
•	 breaches the bail agreement by escaping bail. 
The Petitioner maintains that the Third Paragraph is not a part of the bail transaction; end 
• 
further argues that the anticipated reimbursement of apprehension costs relates to contingl~nt 
•	 costs "unrelated to charges incurred during the bail transaction." Petitioner's Opening Brief pp. 
7, 9. In the words of the Petitioner, the Third Paragraph "provides for reimbursement of
• 
expenses in the event the principal, or defendant, breaches his obligations and fails to appear in .. court." Petitioner's Opening Brief, p. 9. The Petitioner claims that the Third Paragraph, a:; a 
contingent remedy providing relief in the event the bail agreement is breached, is not a part of• 
the original bail transaction. 
C. The Third Paragraph Is a Part of the "Bail Transaction." -
The Respondent believes the Petitioner's Third Paragraph is part of the "bail transaction" -
-
as used in section 41-1042. Before examining this issue further, the parties to the bail bond 
- agreement should be first identified and a few definitions of terms provided. 
In the bail agreement provided by the Petitioner, the parties include the "First Part;'," 





















sIgmng for himself or on behalf of a bail company, and the "surety" is the carner. The-




• According to title 41, Idaho Code, the term "bail" means a "monetary amount required by
 
the court to release the de£endant from custody and to ensure his appearance in court as orderd."
 
• 
Idaho Code § 41-1038(1). The term "bail bond" means a "financial guarantee, posted by a t,ail 
•	 agent and underwritten by a surety insurance company, that the defendant will appear as 
ordered." Idaho Code § 41-1038(3). 
• 
The term "bail bond agreement" is defined as a "suretyship contract between the state on 
• one side and an accused and his or her surety on the other side, whereby the surety guarant(~es 
the appearance of an accused.... The extent of the surety's undertaking is determined by lhe 
• 
bond agreement and is subject to the rules of contract law and suretyship." State v. Castro, 145 
•	 Idaho 993, 995, 188 P.3d 935, 937 (Ct.App. 2008). 
Section 41-1042 uses the term "bail transaction" three times. The term "transaction" is • 
defined as "an act or agreement, or several acts or agreements having some connection with each 
other, in which more than one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such -
- persons between themselves are altered. It is a broader term than 'contract.'" Black's L7W 
Dictionary,	 5th Ed., p. 1341 (1979). 
- The Third Paragraph is a part of the "bail transaction" not only because it is embedded 
























bond agreement. The bail bond agreement is a key part of the overall transaction between the-
parties. R., p. 12. 
• In addition, the Third Paragraph is woven into the terms of the bail transaction. For 
example, the Tenth 1 Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement provides that the contractual-
obligations of the principal (defendant) and any indemnitor are "joint and several," which 
• 
includes the terms set out in the Third Paragraph. R., p. 12. The Tenth Paragraph also pemlits 
•	 the Second Party or surety to proceed against any indemnitor without first seeking remedy from 
the principal (defendant). R., p. 12. The terms, obligations and waivers set out in the Tenth 
• 
Paragraph include the rights and obligations set out in the Third Paragraph. 
•	 Another reason the Third Paragraph is a part of the bail transaction is that the Petitioner 
Two Jinn, Inc., considers it as a contractual remedy or a "promise to pay as in the event of a
• 
breach."	 Tr. Vol. 1,2 p. 26, LL. 8-10; p. 29, LL. 17-18. The Petitioner requires that the Third 
•	 Paragraph be a term of the contract before it will provide bail. Petitioner's Opening Brief, p. :~O; 
see also, Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, LL. 24-25. Further, the Eighth Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement 
provides that any money or other property deposited with the Petitioner may be levied against to 
cover any "hereinabove obligations, liabilities, losses, costs, damages and expenses." This 
-
"TENTH: The obligations hereunder are joint and several and any amounts due shall bear interest at :he 
maximum rate of interest allowed by law. The Second Party and the Surety shall not be first obliged to procl:ed- against the Principal on Bail Bond before having recourse against the First Party or anyone of them, the First Party 
hereby expressly waiving the benefits of law requiring the Second Party or the Surety to make claim upon or to 
proceed or enforce its remedies against the Principal before making demand upon or proceeding and/or enforcing its 
remedies against anyone or more of the First Party." R., p. 12. 
• 
- 2 The reference to "Vol. I" in this Brief is to the hearing transcript of the Hearing held on March 8, 2010, 
before Hearing Officer Jean R. Uranga, Esq. The reference to "Vol. II" in this Brief is the hearing transcript of :he 
Hearing held on July 21, 2010, before the Director of the Department ofInsurance, William W. Deal. 
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includes the Third Paragraph and incurred apprehension expenses. See, "EIGHTH," R., p. 12.-
(See, Footnote No.5).- In the final analysis, the Third Paragraph is a part of the bail transaction because it is one 
• of several "acts or agreem(~nts" included in the overall bail transaction. 
D. As Part of the Bail Transaction, the Third Paragraph Is Not a Permitted Charge 
• or Collection of "Other Valuable Consideration" under Section 41-1042. 
Section 41-1042 states that a "bail agent in any bail transaction shall not, directly or 
• 
indirectly, charge or collect money or other valuable consideration from any person" except for 
•	 those enumerated purposes outlined in subsection (1)(a), (b), and (c). Section 41-1042. 
"Consideration" is defined as "any act, forbearance, creation, modification or destruct: on .. 
of a legal relationship, or return promise given in exchange. In order to constitute considerati,m, .. an act or promise must be bargained for and given in exchange for the promise." Trotzer v. Vig, 
203 P.2d 1056, 1061, 149 Wash.App. 594, 606 (Ct.App. 2009). See, also, Pink v. Busch, E91
• 
P.2d 456,	 100 Nev. 684 (1984) ("...a performance or return promise must be bargained for. A 
•	 performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for lis 
promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise."); and, Sterling Savings BGnk 
v. JHM Properties, LLC, 717 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1149 (2010) ("A promisor receives consideration 
if he receives some right, interest, profit, or other benefit from the promisee."). 
In exchange for bail and release of the defendant and assurance to the court of 1he-
























- apprehension costs in the event of a breach. See, Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, LL. 24-25; and, Petitioner's 
Opening Brief, p. 20. 
• 
As a promise to the Petitioner from the principal and indemnitor for reimbursement of 
apprehension costs in th~: event of a breach, the Third Paragraph is a contractual rem~:dy 
conferred to Two linn, Inc. Thereby, it is valuable consideration given as an element of the bail .. 
agreement entered into between the bail agent, the surety, the principal and the indemnitor. 
•	 E. The Third Paragraph Is Valuable Consideration for the Bail Transaction 
and Does Not ][fall within One of the Enumerated Exceptions. 
As noted above, section 41-1042 prohibits charges or collection of money or other 
valuable consideration from any person, except for the following: "(a) [t]o pay premiums at:he 
rates established by the insurer; (b) [t]o provide collateral; [or] (c) [t]o reimburse the bail agl~nt 
•	 for actual expenses incuITed in connection with the bail transaction" limited to incidental 
expenses not to exceed $50.00 and travel expenses in excess of 25 miles at the IRS businl~ss.. 
mileage rate. Idaho Code § 41-1042(1). As the Third Paragraph is part of the bail agreement 
•	 and the overall bail transaction, does the Third Paragraph fall within any of the exceptions set out 
in section 41-1042(1)(a), (b), or (c)? 
-
Clearly, as a contingent promise to pay apprehension costs, the Third Paragraph does 1Iot 
involve the payment of premiums as stated in section 41-1042(1)(a) and it is not one of 1he 
enumerated exceptions in section 41-1042(1)(c). However, is the Third Paragraph a form of 
























The term "collateral" is defined in title 41, Idaho Code, as "property of any kind given as -
security to obtain a bail bond." Idaho Code § 41-1038(4) (underscore here) . .. 
The first key term used in the definition of "collateral" is "property." The term 
• "property" evidences: 
... ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose 
of a thing in every Iegal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else 
from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition 
which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive 
right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 1095. 
• 
Property includes "both real and personal property." Idaho Code § 73-114(2)(d).3 "'R,~al 
property' is coextensive with lands, tenements and hereditaments, possessory rights and claim5." 
Idaho Code § 73-114(2)(e). "'Personal property' includes money, goods, chattels, things in 
action, evidences of debt and general intangibles4 as defined in the uniform commercial code ­.. secured transactions." Idaho Code § 73-114(2)(c). 
Another key term used in section 41-1038 to describe the meaning of "collateral" is 1he 
definition of "security." A security or security interest is "an interest in personal property or 
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." In re: Wiersma, 382 B.R. 2~14, 
305 (2002) (citing section 28-1-201, Idaho Code). See, also, In re: Cybernetic Services, Inc.,252 
3 "The following words have, in the compiled laws, the signification attached to them in this section, unl ~ss 
otherwise apparent from the context: ... (c) 'personal property' ... (d) 'property' ... (e) 'real property' ..." IdLho 
Code § 73-114(2). 
4- As referenced by the foregoing section 73-114, a "general intangible" is defined as: "any personal propelty, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documeIlts, 
• 
goods, instruments, investment property, letter of credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other mineral 
before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software." Idaho Code § 28-9-1 02(42). 
•
 











F.3d 1039,1044, n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001) ("A 'security interest' is an interest in personal property that • 
secures a payment or the performance of an obligation."). 
• 
In the instant matter, the collateral, or property "of any kind" of monies or other 
.. valuables deposited with the Petitioner, or other permissive liens against property, are given ill a 
fiduciary capacity to the Petitioner as security for the bail bond. See, Idaho Code § 41-1043(2). 
• 
However, the Petitioner takes the position that the Third Paragraph is collateral and that 
•	 "collateral means property of any kind. Any kind. And [Petitioner] submit[s] that that any kind 
includes a promise to pay. A promise to pay in the event of a breach." Tr. Vol. I, p. 29, LL. ]3­
18. 
The Petitioner argues that the Third Paragraph is a promise to pay; therefore it impliedly 
argues the Third Paragraph is a form of promissory note. However the Petitioner may designate 
• 
the Third Paragraph, it is ultimately a contingent promise to pay. A promissory note is an 
•	 "instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary obligation..." Idaho Code § 28·9­
102(65). "A 'promissory note' is itself merely a 'promise or engagement, in writing, to pay a 
specified sum at a time the:rein limited ... to a person therein named, or to his order, or bearer.'" 
In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1347 (9thCir.1983) (quoting, Black's Law 
Dictionary, p. 1093 (5th ed. 1979). "A promissory note is merely a promise to pay-it is not 
security." Washington State Department of Revenue v. Security Pacific Bank of Washington, 
- NA., 109 Wash.App. 795, 808, 38 P.3d 354, 360 (2002). "A promissory note must not depelld 
- upon any contingency whatever." Henry Miller v. David Austen, et ai, 54 U.S. 218, 221 (185 ri. 
• 
• 

















- The Third Paragraph provides Two linn, Inc., a remedy in the event of a breach of 
contract: recourse to the indemnitor or defendant to reimburse the Petitioner for apprehenson 
• 
costs. Therefore, the Third Paragraph is not "property" and does not fall under the exception for 
.. collateral at section 41-1042(1 )(b) as a permitted charge in a bail transaction. 
Even if it could be found to be a form of "property of any kind" within the meaning of 
• 
section 41-1038, the Third Paragraph is not property given as security for a bail bond. In ober 
•	 words, in and of itself the Third Paragraph does not provide recourse to a secured interest in 
personal property that provides payment for apprehension costs. 
If, for the sake of argument, the Third Paragraph was considered collateral and permit.ed 
to be included in the Indemnity Agreement under section 41-1042, it would create an excess ve 
collateral (and in some circumstances a type of double collateral). In many circumstances 
involving the Petitioner, the indemnitor may deposit with the bail bond company cash or other 
types of property as collateral to secure the bail bond and deposit with the bail bond company lhe 
executed Indemnity Agreement inclusive of the Third Paragraph. If, as Petitioner claims, lhe • 
Third Paragraph is collateral to secure the company's reimbursement of apprehension costs, lhe 
deposit of cash or other property and the signed Indemnity Agreement inclusive of the Third 
- Paragraph would constitute excessive collateral that exceeds the amount of bail and therefore 
violates section 41-1043(1). 
- F. The Third Paragraph as a Remedy. 
In addition to claiming that the Third Paragraph is collateral to secure the costs of-
apprehension, the Petitioner also characterizes it as a form of remedy in the contingent event of a 
.. 










breach. For example, see, Petitioner's Opening Brief, pp. 6, 8, 9,12,14,17, and 20; Tr. Vol. I,-
pp. 11, L. 25,12,1. 1; p. 12, LL. 19-22; p. 14, LL. p. 26, LL. 8-10; p. 29, LL. 13-18; and Tr. vol. 
• 
II, p. 11, LL. 9, 18-19; p. 12, LL. 3-4; p. 13, LL. 23-25, p. 14, LL. 1-2, 15-16. 
The Department agrees with the position that the Third Paragraph provides a contractual • 
remedy in the event of a breach of the bail agreement. .. 
The Third Paragraph provides a remedy and recourse directly to the indemnitor or to 
.. other collateral deposited with the bail bond company to secure reimbursement of apprehenson 
costs, but it is not itself the security. Under the Indemnity Agreement's Eighth5 Paragraph, :he.. 
Petitioner has recourse to any security (i.e., cash or other permissive lien) deposited with the tail .. agent if the bail bond agreement is breached. In the event there is no cash or other type of Len 
deposited with Petitioner, under the Third Paragraph, the Petitioner's recourse is directly to -:he 
defendant or any indemnitor that signed the bail bond agreement. .. Idaho's Constitution provides for a "... speedy [judicial] remedy afforded for ev(~ry 
injury of person, property, or character ... [.]" Idaho Const. art. I, § 18. An instructive definition 
of "remedy" is found in Idaho's Uniform Commercial Code, which is defined as "any remedial 
right to which an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal." Idaho Cod(~ § 
According to the Indemnity Agreement at "Paragraph Eighth." in addition to bail amounts or premium unpaid, in the e\ ent - the Indemnity Agreement is breached, Two linn, Inc., has recourse against any monies or other property deposited to secure the 
bail bond, to cover apprehension costs incurred returning the defendant to the court, as follows: 
"That all money or other property which the First Party has deposited or may deposit with the Second Party - [Two linn, Inc.] or the Surety may be applied as collateral security or indemnity for matters contained herein, 
and to accomplish the purposes contained herein, the Second Party [Two linn, Inc.] is authorized to lawfully 
levy upon said collateral in the manner provided by law and to apply the proceeds therefrom and any and all 























































28-1-201 (34). The term "remedy" can also "refer to 'precisely what the plaintiff may reco'fer 
after resorting to the law."" Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F3d 111, 148 (2ndCir. 
2010) (italics in original)(quoting Remedies, Edward D. Re & Joseph R. Re (6th Ed. 200:i)). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines remedy as: "[t]he rights given to a party by law or by contnct 
which that party may exercise upon a default by the other contracting party, or upon:he 
commission ofa wrong (a tort) by another party." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 1163. 
As the above definitions reveal, a remedy provides a ready relief that is contingent uron 
an event such as a breach of contract or other untoward event that results in injury to the person, 
property, or character of a person. In the instant matter, the Third Paragraph provides a remedy 
to Two Jinn, Inc. In the event of a breach, i.e., the defendant escapes bail, the Third Paragraph 
provides that Two Jinn, Inc., and/or the surety will be reimbursed for apprehension costs. In 1he 
event the defendant or other indemnitor gave property as security for the bail bond, in 
accordance with the Indemnity Agreement's Eighth Paragraph, the monies or other propeiy 
posted to secure the bail bond may be used to secure and pay the costs of apprehension. 
In sum, the Third Paragraph provides the bail bond company a remedy in the event of 
breach; however, section 41-1042, Idaho Code, prohibits the Petitioner from including the Thi rd 
Paragraph in the Indemnity Agreement because it is a charge of other valuable consideration that 
does not meet any of the exceptions in subsections (a), (b), or (c) of section 41-1042(1). 














The Respondent respectfully requests that the Court affinn the Director of the Idaho 
• 
Department of Insurance's Findings, Conclusions and Final Order dated August 20, 2010, 
•	 finding that Idaho Code § 41-1042 precludes a bail agent or surety from entering into indemnity 
agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs contemporaneous with the hail 
• 
transaction or from requiring any party to enter into such an indemnity agreement in ordel to 
•	 maintain the validity of a bail bond. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30th day of December, 2010. .. 
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-	 II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The DOl's Declaration that Idaho Code § 4 I-1042 Prohibits Aladdin From Entering Into ,In - Indemnity Agreement at the Time of the Bail Transaction Which Permits Collection of Apprehension Costs Should a Defendant Fail to Appear in Court is Unreasonable 
•	 Section 41-1042 limits charges for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. The 
Third Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement obligates the indemnitor (the criminal defendam 
and/or a third party guarantor) to reimburse the bail agent or surety for expenses that might ar se 
•	 following the bail transaction in the event the criminal defendant breaches the bail bond 
agreement by failing to appear in court as ordered. Thus, the Indemnity Agreement does not 
• 
describe charges for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction and instead, as acknowledged 
• by the Respondent, sets forth the remedies available in the event ofbreach. Indeed, Section 4l­
1042 expressly permits bail agents to collect collateral to secure the bail bond, which necessarily • 
contemplates that the parties will enter into a contract describing remedies in the event of a 
breach of the bail bond agreement. 
Because the Indemnity Agreement does not describe the bail agent's charges for his or her • 
service in the bail transaction, Section 41-1042 does not govern that agreement. To conclude 
otherwise would not only be contrary to the statute's express terms, it would thwart the purpme 
of bail and create significant public safety concerns by discouraging bail agents from capturin!~ -




Declaration that Section 41-1042 precludes a contract providing for reimbursement of
 





























The Respondent's Brief is largely devoted to its argument that the Indemnity Agreement 
is part of the bail transaction. This is irrelevant. Many agreements are part of the bail transaction 
• 
yet not enumerated in Section 41-1042. Section 41-1042 only applies to agreements that set brth 
•	 a "charge" or "money or other valuable consideration" for the bail agent's "service in a bail 
transaction." The Indemnity Agreement neither constitutes valuable consideration for the bail 
• 
agent's service in the bail transaction nor describes charges for that service. As such, Section 41­
•	 1042 does not apply to the Indemnity Agreement and the DOl erred in concluding otherwise. 
The Respondent broadly defines "valuable consideration" and then urges that because the • 
agreement to reimburse apprehension costs fits that definition and is not enumerated, it is 
• precluded. Respondent's Briefpg. 7. However, bail agents require the defendant to agree to <Iny 
number of conditions that fit this sweeping definition of valuable consideration, including the • 
agreement to appear in court, to be monitored, to submit to supervised bail, to provide a third 
• 
party guarantor and to reimburse the bail agent or surety for the amount of any forfeiture. 
•	 The DOl agrees such agreements are appropriate and not precluded by Section 41-1 04:~ 
notwithstanding the fact that they are not enumerated therein. See R 111-112 (Final Order, pp, 3­-
4); March 8, 20 I0 Tr. p. 18, In. 9-22; p. 20, In. 22-24. Moreover, by permitting bail agents to 
"collect money or other valuable consideration" to "provide collateral," Section 41-1042 
expressly contemplates that bail agents will contract for remedies in the event of a breach oftte 
criminal defendant's obligations under the bail bond. See I.C. § 41-1042(1 )(b). 






















..	 that Section 41-1042 precludes agreements concerning recovery of apprehension costs but 
permits similar non enumerated agreements including the agreement to reimburse Aladdin fOl the 
- forfeited bond is entirely inconsistent. See R. 7,60,97; Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's 
•	 Motion to Stay Final Agency Order, pg. 5-6; Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's 
Motion to Stay Final Agency Order, pg. 4. Nevertheless, in its brief, the Respondent again fa Is.. 
to explain how a promise to pay apprehension costs in the event of a breach constitutes "valmlble 
•	 consideration" prohibited by the statute while the promise to pay the face amount of the bond in 
the event of breach does not. • 
The Respondent's inconsistent position is possibly explained by its confusion of the 
• parties to the bail bond itself with the indemnity agreement between the bail agent, surety and 
defendant. The Respondent correctly notes that the bail bond is a suretyship contract between the • 
state on one side and the defendant and his or her surety on the other. Respondent's Briefpg. 5. 
• 
Pursuant to this contract, the surety guarantees the appearance of an accused. State v. 
•	 Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116, 952 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 1998). Neither 
Aladdin nor any third party guarantor are a party to the bail bond and neither the defendant no r a 
• 
third party are obligated to reimburse the surety or the state in the event the defendant fails to 
appear. Conversely, the State ofIdaho is not a party to the Indemnity Agreement between the -
surety, bail agent, defendant and any third party. -
-
-
Despite correctly identifying the parties to the Indemnity Agreement, the Respondent 
refers to that agreement as part of the "bail bond agreement." See Respondent's Briefpg. 5-7. 
The only term set forth in the bail bond agreement is that the surety - in Aladdin's case 


















court as ordered. Aladdin requires that defendants enter the Indemnity Agreement, including its -
requirement that the defendant reimburse Aladdin or its surety for any forfeiture, to secure th(: 
- surety's undertaking pursuant to the bail bond agreement and to protect against loss if the 
•	 defendant breaches his obligations. 
Unlike the breach remedies described in the Indemnity Agreement, a bail agent's service -
in the bail transaction includes tasks such as gathering information concerning a criminal 
•	 defendant's background, ties to the community, family ties, criminal history, credit history, the 
financial wherewithal of all those involved as well as other relevant factors in evaluating the risk 
• 
posed by executing a particular bond. For their part, the consumer is required to pay the 
• premium and to reimburse the bail agent for certain delineated expenses. Locating and 
apprehending a defendant who later absconds, which neither Aladdin nor its surety is legally • 
obligated to do under the bail bond, is not part of the bail agent's "service in a bail transaction." 
• 
The Indemnity Agreement constitutes neither a charge nor valuable consideration for the 
bail agent's service in the bail transaction within the meaning of Section 41-1042. Therefore, the • 
DOl erred in concluding that Section 41-1042 precludes recovery of apprehension expenses a~: 
• 
set forth in the Indemnity Agreement. 
2. If the Third Paragraph is construed as "valuable consideration" charged in a ba 1 -
transaction, then it must be considered as a form of collateral 
To the extent that the contingent agreement described in the Third Paragraph is "valuable -
- consideration" charged in a bail transaction, it is a form of collateral expressly permitted by 
Idaho Code § 41-1042(1 )(b). In response to this argument, the Respondent asserts that the 












- 41-1038(2) and that the agreement is given to secure apprehension costs rather than the bond. 
-
Respondent's Briefpg. 11. Initially, contrary to the Respondent's characterization, Aladdin dJes 
not contend that the Indemnity Agreement is intended to secure the reimbursement of 
• apprehension costs. Rather, the agreement secures the surety's undertaking in agreeing to pay the 
• 
.. 
face amount of the bond to the state by providing recourse for the expenses it incurs in the event 
the defendant fails to appear and the bond is forfeited. I 
The Respondent also argues that as a promise to pay, the Indemnity Agreement is not 
.. "property of any kind." After noting that a promise to pay does not fit the general definition of 
.. either real or personal property, the Respondent devotes almost a page in response to what it 
characterizes as Aladdin's implicit argument that the Indemnity Agreement is a promissary note. 
• Respondent's Brief pg. 10. Aladdin has not contended that the Indemnity Agreement is a 
.. promissory note and, indeed, has consistently described the agreement as the agreement to pay 
expenses only in the event of a contingency - the defendant's breach of his or her obligations. 
.. As the Respondent concedes at pages 12 and 13 of its brief, the Indemnity Agreement is a 
• 
contractual remedy in the ,event of a breach. That agreement is given as security to obtain a be.il 
bond and to guarantee the validity of the principal's promise to appear as ordered by the court 
Even if the Indemnity Agreement is not the type of property that is normally 





I Thus, the DOl is incorrect in its contention that if the Indemnity Agreement is constmed 
as collateral, it would constitute "double" or "excessive" collateral because the agreement 
secures apprehension costs in addition to the bail bond. Respondent's Briefpg. 11. Moreover, 
Aladdin agrees that apprehension costs must be reasonable and cannot be excessive in relation to 










- fonn of collateral than a charge for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. Therefore, if 
the Third Paragraph is construed as "valuable consideration" charged in a bail transaction, then it 
- must be considered as a fonn of collateral. 
•	 3. Summary 
The plain tenns ofIdaho Code § 41-1042 clearly and unambiguously apply to charges 
• 
assessed for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. The Indemnity Agreement does not 
•	 set forth charges assessed for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction and, instead, provldes 
for reimbursement of expenses in the event a contingency occurs - that is the criminal defend;mt 
• 
breaches the tenns for which the bail bond was written by failing to appear in court. By 
• expressly pennitting bail agents to collect collateral, the legislature further affinned its intent:o 
pennit bail agents to contract for their remedies in the event of a breach. • 
Moreover, as described in Aladdin's opening brief, legislative history and public policy 
• 
confinn a legislative intent to allow bail agents to contract for the recovery of contingent loss{:s, 
including apprehension expenses, at the time of the bail transaction. The primary purpose of hail• 
is to ensure the presence of the accused to answer criminal charges. State v. Quick Release Bdl 
• 
Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 655, 167 P.3d 788,792 (Ct. App. 2007). This purpose is served by 
providing the surety a financial incentive to locate fugitives and return them to the court. If 
pennitted to collect the amount of the forfeiture but not its expenses in re-capturing the 
defendant, the bail agent has a financial incentive to let the forfeiture stand and collect from the 
indemnitor. Thus, rather than further the purpose of bail and the significant public safety issues 
- associated therewith, the DOl's interpretation of Section 41-1042 actively thwarts that purpose 


















- furthers the public policy underlying bail bonds by promoting a criminal defendant's appearance 
in court. - The Indemnity Agreement does not set forth charges, money or other valuable 
•	 consideration for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. Accordingly, Section 41-1042 
does not apply to such agreements and the DOl erred in declaring that the Indemnity Agreemmt 
• 
utilized by Aladdin may not require indemnitors to reimburse it or its surety for expenses 
•	 incurred in re-capturing the defendant and returning him or her to custody. 
III. CONCLUSION 
tI 
As set forth above and in Aladdin's Opening Brief, this Court should reverse the Final 
• Order because the DOI' s declaration that Idaho Code § 41-1042 precludes Aladdin from entering 
into an indemnity agreemtmt at the time of a bail transaction which permits collection of• 
apprehension costs later incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear as required is 
• 
unreasonable and prejudices Aladdin's substantial rights.
 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of January, 2011.
 • 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
• 
By ~~~~; 















  .... 
-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE -
I CERTIFY that on January 20, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoin ~ 
document to be: -








Idaho Department of Insurance
 
700 West State Street
 
P.O. Box 83720 • Boise, ID 83720-0043 
• -~-~. 

















:.IQ; 11.1 F~~~D 
I 4- ---­
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JLTDICIAL DISTlMAYr 03 2011 
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) 
IDAHO DEPT. OF INSlJRANCE,	 ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) AND ORDER RE: PETITION 





This case is before the Court on petition for judicial review of declaratory ruling of the 
Idaho Department of Insurance. For the reasons that follow, the decision will be affirmed. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The petitioner, Two Jinn, Inc. (Two Jinn), a bail bond company, sought a declaratc1ry ruling 
from the respondent, the Idaho Department of Insurance (the Department), that I.C. § 41-1042 
does not prevent a bail agent or its surety "from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time 
of a bail transaction which permits the recovery of actual expenses later incurred in CCilllection 
with the apprehension and surrender ofa criminal defendant as a result of that criminal de:endant's 
failure to appear in court as required." Petitioner's Opening Brief, at 1 (citing Administrative 
Record (hereinafter R.), at I). 
The following facts are essentially undisputed: 









Petitioner Two Jinn does business in the State of Idaho as Aladdin Bail Bonds and 
Anytime Bail Bonds. Two Jinn is licensed by the State of Idaho as a producer of 
bail surety insurance. Danielson National Insurance Company is authorized as an 
insurer by the State of Idaho and Danielson's authorized lines of insurance 
include surety insurance. Aladdin utilizes bail bonds issued by Danielson in 
connection with its pretrial release and to that end, uses a form entitled 'Indemnity 
Agreement for Surety Bail Bond.' R. 11-13, 70, 111. The Third Paragraph of thi~ 
Indemnity Agreement requires the parties: 
THIRD: To reimburse Aladdin for actual expenses incurred 
and caused by a breach by the Principal of the terms for 
which the Application and Bail Bond were written, including 
all expenses or liabilities incurred as a result of searching for, 
recapturing or returning Principal to custody, incurred by 
Aladdin or Surety or as necessary in apprehending or 
endeavoring to apprehend Principal, including legal fees 
incurred by Aladdin or Surety in making application to a 
court for an order to vacate or to set aside the order of 
forfeiture or Judgment entered thereon. However, no 
expenses or liabilities incurred for recapturing or returning 
Principal to custody shall be chargeable after the entry of 
Judgment. 
If an individual is arrested for an alleged criminal offense, the individual can be 
released from actual custody upon posting bail. R. 70 (citing I.e. § 19-2906). Bail 
may be posted by filing a bail bond, a property bond, or a cash deposit. R. 70 
(citing I.e. § 19-2907(1) and I.e.R. 46(f)(1)). If a bail bond is posted and the 
criminal defendant fails to appear for court as ordered, the court will order the bail 
forfeited. R. 70 (citing I.e. § 2915). Idaho Code § 19-2914 empowers the surety 
insurance company or its bail agent to arrest the criminal defendant anytime 
before the bail has been exonerated. R. 70-71 (citing I.e. § 19-2914). The 
forfeiture of the bail is exonerated if the criminal defendant is brought before the 
court within 180 days following the order forfeiting the bail. R. 71 (citing I.e. § 
19-2922(5)). 
The Third Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement allows Aladdin and Danielson 
to recover costs expended by them in apprehending and returning a criminal 
defendant to custody who has failed to appear in court as required. R. 71. The 
declaratory ruling issued by the DOl interpreting Idaho Code § 41-1042 prohibits 
Aladdin from utilizing its Indemnity Agreement during the bail transaction for 
this purpose. The Final Order specifically holds: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED that a bail 
agent or surety is precluded by Idaho Code § 41-1042 from entering into 
indemnity agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs, such as the 
Indemnity Agreement, Exhibit A to the December 10, 2009, letter request for 
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declaratory ruling, contemporaneous with the bail transaction, i.e. the writing of 
the bail bond" or from requiring any party to enter into such an indemnity 
agreement in order to maintain the validity of the bail bond. R.12l Petitioner's 
Opening Brief, at 2-4. 
The hearing officer assigned to the case ultimately concluded that "I.e. § 41-1042 
precludes agreements providing for reimbursement of apprehension and surrender cost:; because 
those costs are not expressly delineated as permitted charges for the bail agent's service in a bail 
transaction." !d., at 2 (citing R., at 69). 
The hearing officer's findings were upheld by the director of the Department and Two Jinn 
filed a petition seeking judicial review of this determination. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The procedures concerning judicial review of Idaho state agency determinations are set 
forth in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code § 67-5271 et. seq. as noted 
hereinafter: 
(1) Judicial review of agency action shall be governed by the provisions of this 
chapter unless other provision of law is applicable to the particular matter. 
(2) A person aggrieved by final agency action other than an order in a contested 
case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person complies with 
the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code. 
(3) A party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case decided by an agency 
other than the industrial commission or the public utilities commission is entitled 
to judicial review under this chapter if the person complies with the requirements 
of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279. I. C. § 67-5270. 
In reviewing an agency's decision, the court may not "substitute its judgment for hat of the 
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) Instead, 
the court must defer "to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Price v, 
Memorandum Decision And Order 3 000124
1
Payette County Bd. o/County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); Bennett v. 
State, 147 Idaho 141, 142,206 P.3d 505,506 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Agency action must be affirmed on appeal unless the court determines that the agency's 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory 
provisions; (b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or 
an abuse of discretion. I.e. § 67-5279(3); Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142, 206 P.3d at 506. The party 
attacking the agency's decision bears the burden of demonstrating that the agency erred in a 
manner specified in section 67-6279(3) and that a substantial right has been prejudiced. Price, 131 
Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586; Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142,206 P.3d at 506. 
ANALYSIS 
Two Jinn asselis the following issue on appeal: the Department of Insurance's declaration 
that I.C. § 41-1042 prohibits it from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time oCthe bail 
transaction, which pennits the collection of apprehension costs should a defendant fail to appear in 
court, is unreasonable because the Idaho Legislature did not intend to limit a bail agent's Ibility to 
recover apprehension costs pursuant to an indemnity agreement. 
The relevant statute provides: 
I.e. § 41-1042 COLLECTIONS AND CHARGES PERMITTED: 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a bail agent in any bail 
transaction shall not, directly or indirectly, charge or collect money or other 
valuable consideration from any person except for the following: 
(a) To pay pr,emiums at the rates established by the insurer; 
(b) To provide collateral; 
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(c) To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incurred in connection with 
the bail transaction, limited to the following: 
(i) Expenditures actually and reasonably incurred to verify underwriting 
information or to pay for notary public fees, recording fees, or necessary long 
distance telephone or telegram fees; provided however, that the total of all such 
expenditures reimbursed shall not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00); and 
(ii) Travel e:xpenses incurred more than twenty-five (25) miles from a bail 
agent's place of business, which includes any city or locality in which the bail 
agent advertises or engages in bail business, up to the amount allowed by the 
internal revenue service for business travel for the year in which the travel occurs. 
(2) Except as permitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any 
charge for his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully document 
all expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement. 
The agency's factual findings are not at issue, just its statutory interpretation. When an 
issue of statutory interpretation is involved, the court generally exercises free review. In Ie Daniel 
w., 145 Idaho 677, 679, 183 P.3d 765, 767 (2008).\ 
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction IS that where a statute is plain, clear and 
unambiguous, we are constrained to follow that plain meaning and neither add to the st itute nor 
take away by judicial construction." Poison Creek Publishing, Inc. v. Central Idaho Publishing, 
Inc., 134 Idaho 426, 429, 3 P.3d 1254, 1257 (et. App. 2000) (internal citations omitted). 
"Statutory interpretation always begins with an examination of the literal words of the statute. 
l"An agency's interpretation of its enabling statutes is entitled to deference if a four-pronged test is satisfied. First, the 
agency must have been entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute at issue. Second, the agency's 
statutory construction must be reasonable. Third, the court must determine that the statutory language at issue does not 
treat the precise issue. Fourth, the court must ask whether any of the rationales underlying the rule of def~rence are 
present (the public group's reliance on the agency's interpretation over a period of time; the agency's inttrpretation 
represents a practical interpretation of the statute; the legislature is charged with knowledge of how its satutes are 
interpreted and by not altering the statute, it presumably sanctions the agency's interpretation; the agency's 
interpretation is entitled to additional weight when it is formulated contemporaneously with the passage of :he statute 
at issue; and courts should recognize and defer to the agency's expertise). If the test is met, the court must give 
'considerable deference' to the agency's interpretation." Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 313, 
208 P.3d 289, 295 (2009). It appears that the test is met here, since the Department of Insurance is entruste:l with the 
responsibility of administering the statute and its statutory construction is reasonable and practical. This wo Llld entitle 
the agency's determination to considerable deference. 





1 .! en e 
n
... 
Unless the result is palpably absurd, we must assume that the legislature means what is clearly 
stated in the statute." !d. "We must give the words their plain, usual and ordinary meaning, and 
there is no occasion for construction where the language of a statute is unambiguous." !d. 
"When the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislative body must be given effect, and the Court need not consider the rules of statutory 
construction ... A statute is ambiguous when the language is capable of more than one n:asonable 
interpretation. However, a statute may not be deemed ambiguous merely because partiEs present 
differing interpretations to the court." Farber, 147 Idaho at 310-11, 208 P.3d at 292-93. 
This statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous and this Court would uphold the agency's 
interpretation of it, even if it was entitled to no deference. The statute provides that a bai l agent in 
any bail transaction can collect or charge or receive only the following "from any pelson," (1) 
premiums; and (2) reimbursement for actual expenses incurred in connection with the bail 
transaction. However" these reimbursement expenses are limited to expenditures for verifying 
underwriting information, to pay for notary fees, recording fees, long distance or tele§fam fees 
(not to exceed $50.00) and travel expenses incurred more than 25 miles away from a bal agent's 
place of business (up to the amount allowed by the internal revenue service for business ravel for 
the year in which the travel occurs). 
These are the only expense reimbursements allowed by the statute. There is Simply no 
provision in this statute, which covers "[c]ollections and charges permitted," for a bail agent to 
receive reimbursement for the costs and expenses associated with the recapture of an at scondee, 
except in the context of notary fees, recording fees, long distance or telegram fees (not tD exceed 






$50.00) and travel expenses incurred more than 25 miles away from the bail agent's place of 
business (not to exceed the amount allowed by the IRS for business travel for that year). 2 
Two linn argues that the tenns of the statute are not applicable because it only ::.pplies to 
"bail transactions" and that seeking recovery of expenses incurred pursuant to a bail contract's 
tenns is not a bail transaction. This argument is without merit. 
A bail contract is obviously part of a bail transaction. "'Bail' means a monetar:1 amount 
required by the court to release the defendant from custody and to ensure his appearance in court 
as ordered." I.e. § 41-1038(1). "'Bail bond' means a financial guarantee, posted by a tail agent 
and underwritten by a surety insurance company, that the defendant will appear as ordered." I.e. § 
41-1038(3). 
"A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between the state on one sid;: and an 
accused and his or her surety on the other side, whereby the surety guarantees the appearalce of an 
accused. The extent of the surety's undertaking is detennined by the bond agreemellt and is 
subject to the rules of contract law and suretyship." State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 993, 995, 188 P.3d 
935,937 (et. App. 2008). 
As noted by the Department, a transaction is defined as the "[a]ct of transacting or 
conducting any busim$s; negotiation ... It must therefore consist of an act or agreement, or 
several acts or agreements having some connection with each other, in which more :han one 
person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons between themsdves are 
altered. It is a broader tenn than 'contract.'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 5th Ed., at 134. (1979). 
There is nothing to indicate that Two linn will conduct and conclude a bail transaction wi thout the 
2The hearing officer found! that "the clear and unambiguous language states that a bail agent 'shall not, directly or 
indirectly, charge or collect money or other valuable consideration from any person' except for the specific allowable 
expenses set forth in the statute." Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order, at 7. 
Also, "[t]he statute does not authorize a bail agent to recover costs of apprehension and return unless thos ~ expenses 
include 'travel expenses incurred more than twenty-five (25) miles from a bail agent's place of business. '" !d. 





bail contract forming a part of that transaction. 3 It is a part of the bail transaction and it i:; covered 
by I.e. § 41-1042. 
Two Jinn argues that the statute is not applicable to the expenses recovery proviE ion in its 
indemnity agreement because it is not receiving a charge or collecting a fee for this, 01 that this 
should be considered allowable "collateral." However, the indemnity agreement is a part of the 
overall bail transaction, for which Two Jinn is receiving a fee and collecting a charge. Arguably, 
the collection of costs of apprehension is a "charge". In addition, the applicable porti,)n of the 
statute concerns bail agent reimbursement for charges actually incurred and the statu1e simply 
does not include expenses for recovering an abscondee. Two Jinn's collateral argument also 
distorts the traditional and accepted meaning of that term.4 
The statute could easily state that recovery expenses were allowed to be reimbursed. It 
does not. Two Jinn's arguments are better addressed to the Idaho Legislature. Howevn, at this 
time, the statute simply fails to allow for this. 
Accordingly, in view ofthe foregoing, the decision of the Department is hereby affirn1ed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 




Kathryn S . klen 
Senior Dis ict Judge 
)"Aladdin requires that defendants enter the Indemnity Agreement, including its requirement that the defendant 
reimburse Aladdin or its surety for any forfeiture, to secure the surety's undertaking pursuant to the bail bond 
agreement and to protect against loss if the defendant breaches his obligation." Petitioner's Reply Brief, at 4. 
4Collateral is "[p]roperty which is pledged as security for the satisfaction of a debt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 5th 
Ed., at 237 (1979). 
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
 
INSURANCE AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY MR. .fOHN C. KEENAN, DEPUTY
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 700 WEST STATE
 




NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Two linn, Inc. ("Two linn"), appeals against the 
above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the "Memorandum Decision and 
Order Rc: Petition Seeking ludicial Review:" which was entered in the above entitled action OIl 
the 3rd day of May, 2011, the Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, presiding. 
2. Two .finn has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order 
described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (f) of the 
Idaho Appellate Rules ("LA.R."). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which Two .finn presently intends 
to assert is: 
Is the Idaho Department ofInsurance's declaration that Idaho Code § 41-1042 preclude:; 
Two linn from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bail transaction which 
permits collection of apprehension costs later incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear 
as required in court unreasonable and does it prejudice Two linn's substantial rights? 
Two .finn may assert other issues on appeal as permitted by Rule. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. a. The reporter's transcript is requested. 
b. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic format: 










(1) Argument on Motion to Stay held October 4,2010; 
(2) Oral argument held February 16, 201 I. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
a.	 Motiion to Stay Final Agency Order filed September 3, 2010; 
b.	 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Stay filed September 3, 2010; 
c.	 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay filed September 3,2010; 
d.	 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Stay Final Agency Order filed 
September 16, 2010; 
e.	 Order Governing Judicial Review filed September 20,20 10; 
f.	 Amended Notice of Lodging Agency Record and Transcripts filed 
Sept1ember 24, 2010; 
g.	 Certiificate of Agency Record filed September 29,2010; 
h.	 Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion to Stay filed 
September 30, 2010; 
i.	 Orde:r Granting Petitioner's Motion to Stay Final Agency Order filed 
October 4, 2010; 
J.	 Petitioner's Opening Brief filed December 2, 2010; 
k.	 Respondent's Brief filed December 30, 2010; 
I.	 Petitioner's Reply Brief filed January 20, 2011. 
7.	 I certifY: 
a. That no court reporter is identified on the Register of Actions for this ca~ e 

















as being present during the proceedings in which a transcript has been 
requested and therefore this notice of appeal has not been served on a 
reporter. 
b.	 That the clerk of the district court has not been paid the estimated fee fo)' 
preparation of the reporter's transcript because no estimate is currently 
available. The estimated fee will be paid as soon as the estimate is 
provided. 
c.	 That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid 
d.	 That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e.	 That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 and the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section 67-1401 (I). 
rz.­
DATED this 1- day of June, 2011. 




Attorneys for Appellant Two Jinn, Inc.
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I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial Districl of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBIT~; to 
the Record: 
1.	 Agency's Record On Petition For Judicial Review. 
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Court this 27th day of July, 2011. 
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